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Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of 
Documentary Film 
Jessica M. Silbey* 
 
This Article explores side-by-side two contemporary and related film trends:  
the recent, popular enthusiasm for the previously arty, documentary film and the 
mandatory filming of custodial interrogations and confessions. 
The history and criticism of documentary film shows, and  contemporary movie 
audiences understand, the documentary film as a tool of political and social 
advocacy, in which a story is told using the medium of film to convey a specific, 
usually not  unbiased message (recent examples are Michael Moore’s  Fahrenheit 
9/11 and Errol Morris’s Fog of War).  By contrast, judges, advocates and 
legislatures, assume that films of custodial interrogations and confessions, which 
also serve a “documentary” purpose, reveal truth and lack a distorting point of 
view.  As this Article will explain, the trend at law, although aimed at furthering 
venerable criminal justice principles, holds a fairly naïve view of film’s indexical 
relationship to the lived world and typically ignores consideration of the 
contemporary trend in cinema.  Understanding the documentary as truth-revealing 
is a mistake, a mistake which can frustrate (if not undermine) the criminal justice 
goals of the legislative policies.  Understanding the impulse to film custodial 
interrogations as an impulse born through documentary filmmaking transforms our 
understanding of the object of the film exercise from revealing a truth (of guilt or 
lack of coercion) into reconstituting (an image of) the world into one favored by the 
filmmaker. 
Whatever may explain the convergence of filmmaking in the precinct house and 
a penchant for mainstream documentary movie-going, the trends are shaping 
contemporary expectations about film in contradictory ways.  Investigating these 
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trends together exposes competing norms regarding film as a legal tool and as a 
knowledge-producing discourse.  It also situates the criminal justice trend in the 
context of a long history of filmmaking and critical spectatorship.  In light of the 
growing use of film as a policing mechanism, better understanding of film as both 
an art and a legal tool is in order. 
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“Photography implies that we know about the world if we accept it as the 
camera records it.  But this is the opposite of understanding, which starts from not 
accepting the world as it looks.”1 
 
“To re-present the event is clearly not to explain it.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Reality television.  Mockumentary.  Docudrama.  Infotainment.  Faux doc.  
Agitprop.3  These words describe a trend in contemporary film and television that 
combines a developing taste for documentary-like form with fiction-like content.  
Indeed, the surge in documentary films going mainstream confirms that the 
excitement for documentary-like films has reached “far beyond the art house 
crowd.”4  Consider the recent blockbuster films by Errol Morris (Fog of War) and 
Michael Moore (Farenheit 9/11), or the less well-known but similarly surprising 
sleeper hits, such as Control Room (by Jehane Noujaim), Capturing the Friedmans 
(by Andrew Jarecki), SuperSize Me (by Morgan Spurlock), Metallica (by Joe 
Berlinger) or Biggie and Tupac (by Nick Broomfield).5  The most recent hits of 
2005—Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (by Alex Gibney) and The Year of 
the Yao (by Adam Del Deo and James D. Stern)—confirm the growing 
appreciation by the American public for documentary-style films. 
 
1. SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 23 (1977) (emphasis omitted). 
2. BILL NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 
121 (1994) [hereinafter NICHOLS, BOUNDARIES] (emphasis omitted). 
3. See, e.g., Peter Hogue, Genre-busting: Documentaries as Movies, FILM COMMENT, July-Aug. 
1996, at 56  (“Once upon a time, ‘documentary’ meant ‘factual film’ or ‘propaganda,’ or both.  Now, 
various kinds of documentary style are so prevalent in film and television—in commercials, TV news, 
music videos, etc.—that it may have come to mean ‘infotainment,’ or ‘promotional illustration,’ more 
than anything else.”); Irene Lacher, Documentary Criticized for Reenacted Scenes, N.Y. TIMES, March 
29, 2005, at E1, E7 (calling 2005 Oscar-winning documentary short MIGHTY TIMES: THE CHILDREN’S 
MARCH a “faux doc” after film directors’ “failure to disclose their use of reenactments called into 
question the nature of reality implied by the use of the term documentary”). 
4. Elizabeth Millard, Exposing Injustice, ABA JOURNAL, May 2005, at 22.  See also Mark Feeney, 
The View Finder: Documentarian Ross McElwee Has an Eye for the Personal and the Philosophical, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2004, at C1 (chronicling the life and films of documentaries Ross 
McElwee, reporting that “[l]ately, audience interest in documentaries as a genre has been anything but 
sidelong.  Such films as ‘Super Size Me,’ ‘Capturing the Friedmans,’ and ‘The Fog of War’ have been 
indie hits.  ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’ has been much more than that. . . .’  The documentary universe has been 
expanding,’ says [director of Sundance film festival Geoffrey] Gilmore.  One used to be able to speak of 
this as a marginal enterprise. . .”).  See infra note 236 (discussing the ebb and flow of the status of 
documentary film in popular culture). 
5. See, e.g., Louis Menand, Nanook and Me: “Fahrenheit 9/11” and the Documentary Tradition, 
THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 9 & 16, 2004, at 90 (“Whatever you think of Michael Moore’s immensely 
satisfying movie about the awful Bush Administration and its destructive policies—and reasonable 
people can disagree, of course—one thing that cannot be said about ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’ is that it is an 
outlaw from the documentary tradition.”).  Other recent documentary films include: Spellbound, Crumb, 
The Weather Underground, My Architect, Mr. Death, Bowling for Columbine, Brother’s Keeper and 
Aileen Wournos: The Selling of a Serial Killer. 
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=892401
SILBEY 3/7/2006  1:03:55 PM 
110 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [29:2 
And, of course, we can go beyond contemporary film to television.  Consider the 
series “Survivor,” “The Apprentice,” “Super Nanny” and “Queer Eye for the 
Straight Guy”—all television shows that, like documentary films, tantalize with the 
promise of unstaged and revealing images of real people. 
This contemporary trend in American moving images dates to the birth of 
cinema in 1895, the first films being “actuality” films—films of only a couple of 
minutes in length documenting a single historical event, such as a train arriving in a 
station or factory workers being let out for the day.6  These actuality films later 
developed into the first established film genre:  the documentary.  With deep roots 
in the history of the moving image, the contemporary trend in documentary film 
and reality television parallels yet another film trend, but this time a trend at law: 
the filming of custodial interrogations. 
The nationwide trend requiring that custodial interrogations be filmed is based 
not only on documentary impulses (the ostensible recordation of a real event).  The 
trend is also based on venerable criminal justice goals—streamlining criminal cases 
and protecting the constitutional rights of the accused by preserving on film 
evidence of guilt or innocence, police coercion or voluntary inculpatory statements.  
At last count, approximately 238 cities and counties, including Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and Houston, had instituted mandatory recording of custodial 
interrogations.7  Five states and the District of Columbia also require the filming of 
custodial interrogations by statute or case law, and similar legislative initiatives are 
under consideration in a substantial number of the states in the nation.8 
This trend at law requiring the filming of custodial interrogations (and their 
 
6. See, e.g., GERALD MAST & BRUCE F. KAWIN, THE MOVIES: A SHORT HISTORY 22 (1996) 
(describing the Lumière brothers’ actuality films L’arrivée d’un train en gare and La sortie des usines 
Lumière). 
7. See Appendix (compilation of legislation—pending and passed—mandating the recording of 
custodial interrogations).  Currently, Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas and the 
District of Columbia have, by statute or case law, mandated the electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations.  See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (state constitutional due 
process); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2005) (homicide cases only); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B [1] [K] (2005) (“serious crimes”); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d. 587, 592 (Minn. 
1994) (exercise of supervisory powers); http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/recordation.pdf 
(resulting in the adoption of a procedural rule and the endorsement of model jury instructions regarding 
the recordation of custodial interrogations) (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 38.22 (Vernon 2001) (oral and sign language statements); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-116.01 (2005) 
(crimes of violence); see also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-534 (Mass. 2004) 
(holding that a defendant whose interrogation has not been completely recorded is entitled, on request, 
to an instruction that “the State’s highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations be 
recorded whenever practicable” and that, because of the absence of recording, evidence of the 
defendant’s alleged statement should be weighed “with great caution and care”).  As of summer 2005, 
law enforcement agencies in at least 238 cities and counties, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, San 
Diego, Houston and Portland, Oregon, regularly record custodial interviews of suspects in felony or 
other serious investigations.  See Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Custodial 
Interrogations, Special Report of Center on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University School of 
Law, at 4, A1-A10 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan Report], available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/SullivanReport.pdf. 
8. See infra Appendix.  See also William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, 
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN BRIEF (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C.), March 1993, at 1. 
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inevitable confessional climax), although based on a documentary film impulse, 
nevertheless develops a fairly naïve view of film’s indexical relationship to the 
lived world.  Underlying this trend is the belief that filming the custodial 
interrogation will streamline criminal cases because filmed interrogations 
uncontroversially demonstrate the voluntariness (or coerciveness) of the confession 
and therefore the truth of guilt (or innocence) of the accused.  In other words, the 
criminal justice system perceives the film as objective and unambiguous.9 
The other trend—the resurgence of documentary as a form of mainstream 
entertainment, be it in a movie theater or on television—is like the legal trend 
insofar as the film transforms previously mundane subject matter into a spectator 
sport.10  Unlike the legal trend, however, mainstream documentary is (and has 
historically been) perceived critically by reviewers and spectators alike, so much so 
that the tongue-in-cheek vocabulary with which I began this article (e.g., 
“docudrama” and “faux doc”) has developed to describe the evolving documentary 
genre as an ironic (as opposed to a sincere) art form. 
In other words, contemporary criticism of documentary understands the genre as 
political and social advocacy, viz. Michael Moore documentaries are perceived and 
reviewed critically and with skepticism.  Judges, advocates and legislatures 
perceive filmed interrogations and confessions as truth-revealing films that purport 
to be unbiased and unambiguous representations of a historical event.  What do we 
make of these conflicting contemporary trends?  Why do we consider 
contemporary and popular documentaries such as Fahrenheit 9/11 critically but not 
a precinct house film of a criminal confession? 
This Article explores side-by-side these two contemporary film trends.  
Whatever may explain the convergence of filmmaking in the precinct house with a 
popular penchant for mainstream documentary movie-going, the two trends are 
shaping contemporary expectations about film in contradictory ways.  Investigating 
these trends together exposes competing norms regarding film as a legal tool and as 
a knowledge-producing discourse.11  Such an investigation also situates the 
 
9. See, e.g., CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 127-323 (1956) 
(“The ideal solution is the sound motion picture, that combination of sound and sight which most nearly 
represents to the senses the event itself.”). 
10. For well-known essays on the wide-spread effect of reproducible and reproducing images on 
society (in film or television), see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATIONS (Sheila Faria 
Glaser trans., Univ. of Michigan Press 1998) (1981) and GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE 
SPECTACLE (Zone Books 1995) (1967).  The latter is the origin of the phrase “society of the spectacle.”  
See also DAVID C. CHANEY, FICTIONS OF COLLECTIVE LIFE: PUBLIC DRAMA IN LATE MODERN 
CULTURE (1993) (distinguishing between a “spectacular society” and a “society of the spectacle,” the 
former being structured around ritualized and allegorical dramatization of social order, the latter being a 
society that lacks structure, one in which spectacles proliferate indeterminacy and dramatize feelings of 
isolation rather than community). 
11. It is possible, of course, that one explanation for the competing norms regarding filmmaking 
and legal process is that films are perceived as simply entertainment, without serious consequence, and 
law is perceived as per se affective, the incarnation of power and control.  Otherwise put, it is possible 
the aforementioned criticism of documentary film is a complaint that film is just film and shouldn’t 
purport to be truth-revealing or evidentiary at all, whereas the same cannot be said of law because as a 
system it exactly promises a believable or justifiable truth.  To be clear from the outset, I disagree with 
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criminal justice trend in the context of a long history of filmmaking and critical 
spectatorship.  In light of the growing use of film as a policing mechanism, better 
understanding of film as both an art and a legal tool is in order. 
As this Article will explain, understanding the documentary as a truth-revealing 
film genre is a mistake.  Indeed, its history counsels otherwise.  As such, if we 
understand the impulse to film custodial interrogations as an impulse born through 
documentary filmmaking, the impulse becomes not one to reveal any truth (of guilt 
or lack of coercion) but instead to transform (an image of) the world.12 
When the use of film by police and prosecutors is realized through the lens of 
film history and theory—in particular the history of documentary filmmaking—the 
criminal justice trend becomes a misguided attempt at thwarting police misconduct 
and fast-tracking convictions.  Film theory, generally, problematizes the 
epistemological claim that is popularly perceived to underlie documentary film—
that documentary is a window onto some uncontestable truth.  The history of 
documentary film, specifically, teaches us that from its beginnings the genre took 
the form of a collaboration between the filmmaker and the state.  Through the 
experience of ritualized spectatorship, documentary film embodied a “rhetoric of 
social persuasion” the goal of which was to affect some ideal political or social 
order.13 Resituating filmed custodial interrogations and confessions in terms of 
both film theory generally and documentary history specifically demonstrates how 
the criminal justice trend and the use of film as a policing tool perpetuate the 
misunderstanding of film as the best evidence of historical events and as the most 
trustworthy source of information about what happened in the precinct house. 
I have elsewhere explored similar questions regarding filmic evidence more 
generally, advocating the recategorization of filmic evidence—like “day in the life” 
films, expert demonstrations, crime scene footage and surveillance footage—from 
demonstrative evidence to substantive evidence.14  This Article continues this 
 
both formulations—of film as a cultural (and not a knowledge-producing) practice and of law as truth-
revealing (and not a norm-producing) system.  One premise of this Article, therefore, is the affinity 
between law and film as systems of meaning, as discourses through which power is reproduced and 
enacted, and as cultural institutions that are shaped both by the formal actors in them (e.g., lawyers, 
judges, filmmakers, actors and writers) and by the consumers or subjects of them (e.g., litigants, 
defendants, victims and film audiences).  For further discussion of the affinities between law and film 
and the promises of the interdisciplinary study combining both, see Jessica Silbey, What We Do When 
We Do Law and Popular Culture, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 139 (2002).  See also Naomi Mezey & Mark 
C. Niles, Screening the Law:  Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
91 (2005); Orit Kamir, Why ‘Law-and-Film’ and What Does it Actually Mean? A Perspective, 19 
CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 255 (2005). 
12. As will be argued infra, one can interpret the dominant meaning of the police film as one in 
which those who confess are guilty and the police who elicit confessions serve the public good. 
13. Bill Nichols, Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde, 27 CRITICAL INQUIRY 580, 
582 (2001) [hereinafter Nichols, Avant-Garde]. See also id. at 594 (“The emergence of a documentary 
film practice in the 1920s and 1930s drew together various elements of photographic realism, narrative, 
modernism, and rhetoric at a historical moment when the technology of cinema and the techniques of 
persuasion could serve the needs of the modern nation-state.”). 
14. Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. 
J. L. REFORM 493 (2004) [hereinafter Judges as Film Critics].  Judges as Film Critics shows how courts 
and advocates fail to consider film as film—as a subjective retelling of the story at issue with a point of 
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earlier work and develops one of the categories of filmic evidence.  In particular, 
this Article explores the category of film I call “evidence verité”15—legal films that 
purport to be unmediated and unself-conscious film footage of actual events, such 
as crime scene films, surveillance films and filmed custodial interrogations.  By 
reconsidering evidence verité as a species of documentary film, especially in light 
of the contemporary trend in documentary filmmaking, evidence verité is 
appropriately understood as a species of political or social advocacy.  This Article 
argues that reconsidering filmed interrogations and confessions in light of the 
history and theories of documentary filmmaking facilitates and sustains the critique 
of legal films (especially evidence verité) as the best or truest account of the event 
to be adjudicated (whether the voluntariness of the confession or the crime to which 
it refers).  This critique makes room for scrutiny of and skepticism toward some of 
the most recalcitrant and powerful evidentiary proffers (confessions and filmic 
evidence) in criminal cases.16 
This comparison between police films and documentary films also informs the 
trend of police filmmaking through the discussion of film studies.17  It will 
encourage thinking about police as filmmakers and about film as a policing tool.18  
It will also encourage the application of the critical vocabulary describing 
contemporary documentary to the new trend of filmmaking in the precinct house.19  
 
view and a distinct perspective.  This failure results in missed opportunities to cure prejudice and 
properly direct the evidentiary calculations at trial.  See id. at 499-501.  Film, like any story, is open to 
interpretation and debate.  That all film is fictional—that is, from the Latin fictio or fingere, which 
means to shape, form, to make up and put together—does not offend our sense of the trial’s purpose 
because trials, of course, are “fictional” too, inasmuch as they are “made up” and “put together” by 
competing stories that are contested, contrasted and interpreted for their best, most persuasive ending. 
15. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 501, 507-09. 
16. Confessions are considered “the most potent weapons for the prosecution.”  Saul M. Kassin & 
Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27 (1997).  See also Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental 
Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 
741-43 (1997) (discussing the importance of confessional evidence in the trial process); Paul G. Cassell 
& Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 839, 906-09 (1996) (surveying prosecutors, 61% of whom identify confessions as 
“essential” or “important” for conviction). 
17. See, e.g., Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture, 27 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 139, 145 (2002) (arguing that when engaging in interdisciplinary legal scholarship, one 
should “mind the tenets of the disciplines we are marrying, such as those of literary [or film] theory and 
legal practice, so that we do not abandon the lessons already learned and established” by each). 
18. It is, of course, true that police are filmmakers in the sense that the nationwide trend is that 
police are filming interrogations.  It is also true that film is increasingly a police tool—for surveillance 
and for disposing of challenges to confessions, among other usages.  See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Videos 
Challenge Hundreds of Convention Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A1 (reporting that 
videographers were used by police and protesters to prosecute or defend cases arising out of 2004 
Republican National Convention).  As an example of the kinds of products being sold to police 
departments as part of this nationwide trend, see the technology called the Nutcracker™ Interview 
Management System, advertised at http://www.cardinalpeak.com/products.html. 
19. For examples of this critical vocabulary, see, e.g., Roger Ebert, “9/11”: Just the Facts?, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, June 18, 2004, at 55; Cynthia Greenlee-Donnell, Hybrid Series to Test Documentary Limits, 
HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), Mar. 26, 2004, at D13; Jack Mathews, Oliver Stone and “JFK”: The 
Debate Goes On?,  L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, at 99. 
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Is it not odd that where the vocabulary exists in the popular media to critique 
documentarists like Michael Moore,20 that same critical rhetoric is absent in 
circumstances in which films are made and used by the state against criminal 
defendants?  This Article will explain this oddity as a misunderstanding of film’s 
formal properties and signifying practice and attempt to import the robust criticism 
of contemporary documentary film to filmmaking at law, in order to render more 
precise and fair the criminal adjudication process. 
Film is a language and an art, no matter how unscripted or haphazard its form.  
Film, like written or spoken language, is a medium through which messages are 
relayed.  What messages are being sent by the filmed interrogation and confession?  
How might we understand the filming of the interrogation as an evitable part of its 
message?  Understanding filmed interrogations as a form of state-sponsored 
documentary will go a long way toward challenging the view that filmed 
confessions record what “really happened” at the crime scene and in the 
interrogation room.  As will be discussed further below, a film records one version 
of historic events, but not the only one; it is a form of fiction, recording pieces of 
reality that are “put together”—constructed and documented—for film.  Film no 
more “shows” the whole truth (or lack thereof) of a confession or its referent than 
does the rest of the evidence that bears on the issue. 
To be clear, I am not advocating that interrogations not be filmed or that filming 
custodial interrogations or confessions fails to promote criminal justice.21  But I am 
suggesting that when we consider film we ought to consider it differently, not as a 
cure-all for police coercion or false confessions but as one version of the events in 
the precinct house, of which there are likely many.  Recalling the debates about 
Miranda warnings forty years ago, prophylactic measures can aim to protect the 
accused at the same time as they can arbitrarily (and discriminatorily) authenticate 
or sanitize statements made by defendants after being warned of the right to be 
silent.22  Just as Miranda warnings may have helped but were far from the solution 
 
20. See, e.g., Phil Rosenthal, Who Do You Believe: us or Michael Moore?, CHI. SUN-TIMES,  July 
13, 2004, at 47; Roger Ebert, ‘9/11’: Just the Facts?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 18, 2004, at 55; Editorial, 
Fahrenheit 9/11 Moore’s Movie: Nobody in the Middle, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 4, 2004, at 3H. 
21. Indeed, I am persuaded by the many accounts that videotaping interrogations and confessions 
will have positive effects on police professionalism and defendants’ constitutional rights.  See, e.g., 
Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice (February 14, 2005) 
(unpublished student paper previously posted on Student Scholarship Series website, Yale Law School) 
(on file with author); Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s Try 
Video Oversight, 34  J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (2001); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-692 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Miranda Impact].  
However, these effects are in part due to the naïve, though popular, notion of film as an unbiased and 
objective observer of historical events. 
22. As one expert on Miranda has written, 
 
 [T]rial judges have learned to use Miranda to simplify the decision to admit interrogation-
induced statements and to sanitize confessions that might otherwise be deemed involuntary if 
analyzed solely under the more rigorous Fourteenth Amendment due process voluntariness 
standard. . . .  Miranda has not changed the psychological interrogation process that it excoriated, 
but has only motivated police to develop more subtle and sophisticated—and arguably more 
compelling—interrogation strategies. 
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to police coercion and false confessions, the filming of custodial interviews is 
similarly no panacea.  Filming interrogations and confessions may deter some 
police misconduct, and it may aid defendants to prove in a court of law that they 
did request to speak with an attorney, but filmmaking in the precinct house should 
not be mistaken for an inevitable or unalterable unbiased and moral observer that 
will prevent police abuse or liberate the wrongly accused. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part One reviews the legislative enactments 
and policies that embody the nationwide trend toward filming custodial 
interrogations.  It includes a discussion of the seminal cases that address the legal 
virtues and obligations concerning the filming of interrogations.  This Part 
concludes with a discussion of some lower court decisions analyzing filmed 
confessions.  It highlights several problematic assumptions motivating the cases 
and the underlying legislation, among them that the film form authenticates rather 
than shapes the truth of the event on or referenced in film. 
Part Two tells the story of the documentary film genre.  It traces the history of 
documentary from the birth of cinema in 1894 to its heyday in the 1920s and 1930s 
as a form of state-sponsored political activism.  By focusing on the roots of 
documentary film, this Part explains how contemporary documentary does not aim 
to reveal a truth but rather, through the authority and power of the film form, aims 
to convince the audience of a particular point of view.  This Part shows how 
documentary was born of an impulse to question film’s epistemological 
significance in the first instance.   
Part Three revisits the legislative history and the case law in light of the history 
and theory discussed in Part Two.  In so doing, this last Part resituates the trend of 
filmmaking in the precinct house within the broader cultural context of 
documentary filmmaking.  The goal of this last part—and indeed the Article—is to 
reorient the evidentiary and criminal justice debate about film as a legal tool around 
the idea of police as filmmakers and filmmaking as a kind of storytelling.  It is 
commonplace to talk about law in terms of its storytelling function.23  It should be 
 
 
Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1000, 1027 (2001).  See also Leo, Miranda Impact, supra note 21, at 633-34 (“Miranda appeared to 
have little impact on police behavior during interrogation, since detectives continued to employ many of 
the psychological tactics of persuasion and manipulation that the Warren Court had deplored in 
Miranda.”); id. at 640-41 (“[P]olice use the warnings to their advantage in order to overcome the 
evidentiary burden of demonstrating that a voluntary statement was obtained.  ‘Thus . . . the impact of 
Miranda on the ultimate interrogation contest seems to have been effectively neutralized.’”) (citation 
omitted); id. at 665.  As an example of “getting around” Miranda, see the discussion in Missouri v. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (2004), about the “Miranda two-step” where Miranda warnings were given 
mid-interrogation, after defendant gave an unwarned confession, only to have defendant repeat the 
confession after Miranda warnings were properly issued. 
23. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 2-3, 246-81 
(2000) (through close readings of Supreme Court decisions, showing how the structure of storytelling 
shapes the high court’s opinions about, among other things, race and family); SUSAN SILBEY & 
PATRICIA EWICK, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW 28-29 (1998) (a study of law and narrative toward a 
theory of legal consciousness); LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Paul Gewirtz 
and Peter Brooks eds., 1996) (volume of collected essays exploring how law and legal practice is as 
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no great leap to talk about filming law as part and parcel of the stories being told. 
I.  CASE LAW AND POLICY 
Although currently only Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas 
and the District of Columbia mandate the recording of custodial interrogations, as 
the Appendix to this Article demonstrates, a substantial portion of states’ 
legislatures are debating similar legislation.24  In addition, even absent state law 
(whether judicially or legislatively mandated), police and sheriff departments in at 
least 238 cities, counties and towns, including Los Angeles, Orange County (CA), 
Phoenix, Denver, St. Louis, Broward County (FL) and Miami, require the 
recording of custodial interviews.25 
The rationales underlying these laws are fairly consistent.  Recorded custodial 
interrogations are widely believed to protect defendants from coercive police 
tactics, promote prosecutions of the truly guilty and preserve public confidence in 
the criminal justice system.  These rationales, while fairly debated in the case law, 
state legislatures and locally, also routinely ignore the peculiarities of film as an 
expressive medium and a legal tool which, when considered closely, undermine the 
very reasons for the rule. 
A.  CASE LAW 
There are a variety of sources for the legal requirement of filming custodial 
interviews.  Among them are constitutional due process, judicial supervisory 
authority, state legislation and local ordinance.26 
Only one state’s supreme court—Alaska’s—has held that due process under the 
state constitution requires the recording of custodial interviews.27  The case is 
twenty years old, but its discussion is instructive for the judicial and legislative 
policy debates that follow. 
Stephan v. State holds that an unexcused failure to electronically record a 
custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a suspect’s right 
to due process under the Alaska Constitution.28  As a result of Stephan, any 
custodial statement under Alaska’s jurisdiction that is not recorded is generally 
inadmissible against the defendant.29  As an exclusionary rule, Stephan lays the 
 
much about rules and policy as it is about storytelling, narrative structure and performance); Patricia 
Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 AM. J. 
SOCIETY 1328 (2003); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Susan 
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). 
24. See infra Appendix. 
25. See Sullivan Report supra note 7, at Appendix A.  See also infra Appendix for a complete list 
of implemented legislation. 
26. E.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (due process); Scales, 518 N.W.2d. 
at 592 (judicial supervisory authority); 20 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 3930/7.2 (West 2005) (state 
legislation); 25 ME. REV. STAT. ANN  tit. 25, § 2803-B, sub-§ 1, paragraph K (2005). 
27. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164. 
28. Id. at 1158. 
29. Id. 
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groundwork for the comparison of policies underlying Miranda (the 
implementation of pre-interrogation warnings of right to counsel and privilege 
against self-incrimination) with the policies (and their implementation) underlying 
the requirement for filming interrogations.30 
According to Stephan, there are two reasons the Alaska Constitution requires 
that interrogations be recorded:  (1) to protect the accused’s rights of due process 
and (2) to protect the public interest in honest and effective law enforcement.  As to 
the first, recording the interrogation is “essential to the adequate protection of the 
accused’s right to counsel, his right against self incrimination and . . . his right to a 
fair trial,”31 which rights are specifically guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.32  
An accused’s waiver of his right to counsel and the admission against him of 
inculpatory statements made during interrogation are countenanced only upon a 
determination that the statements and waiver were both knowing and voluntary.33  
The Stephan court said that because an electronic recording “provides an objective 
means for evaluating what occurred during interrogation”—what statements were 
made, what words were spoken, what the court calls an “accurate and complete 
record [of] [t]he contents of an interrogation”—no legitimate reason exists not to 
require it.34  Indeed, the court held that adequate protection of constitutional rights 
demands it. 
In other words, recording an interrogation is a means of preserving exculpatory 
or otherwise helpful evidence for the purposes of a suppression hearing or trial.  
“The importance of . . . a . . . recording lies in the fact that trial courts and appellate 
courts tend to trust police officers’ recollections of what occurred at the expense of 
the criminal defendant’s account.  Thus, in the absence of a . . . recording, the 
prosecuting authorities invariably win the swearing contest.”35  As Miranda 
explained almost forty years ago, “[t]he difficulty in depicting what transpires at 
such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken 
place incommunicado. . . . Interrogation still takes place in privacy.  Privacy results 
in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes 
on in the interrogation rooms.”36  Because the state and defendant can (and 
inevitably do) dispute the events that transpired in the interrogation room, “the 
accused[’s] . . . right to a fair trial may be violated, if an illegally obtained, and 
possibly false confession is subsequently admitted.  An electronic recording . . . 
protects the defendant’s constitutional rights, by providing an objective means for 
 
30. See, e.g., supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
31. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1159-60. 
32. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 11.  These are the same reasons provided for the criminal 
exclusionary rule generally: to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement and to insure judicial 
integrity by prohibiting courts from becoming party to “lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.”  Stephan, 711 P.2d 
at 1163 n.25 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).  The state’s obligation in this regard under 
the Alaska Constitution is the same.  Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1161. 
34. Stephan, 711 P.2d  at 1160-61 (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 1158 n.6 (quoting Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397, 414 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)). 
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-48. 
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him to corroborate his testimony concerning the circumstances of the 
confession.”37 
The second reason Alaska constitutionally requires the recording of 
interrogations—to protect the public interest—is no less weighty, although it is 
given significantly shorter shrift in the decision.  “[A] recording . . . protects the 
public’s interest in honest and effective law enforcement, and the individual 
interests of those police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics.”38  Here, 
the court alludes to what will become more prominent themes in the state 
legislative debates: minimizing false charges of coercion and promoting 
prosecutions of the truly guilty.  “A recording, in many cases, will aid law 
enforcement efforts by confirming the content and the voluntariness of a confession 
when a defendant changes his testimony or claims falsely that his constitutional 
rights were violated.”39  This furthers the public interest in at least two ways.  It 
helps maintain (or rehabilitate) law enforcement’s reputation for fair and upright 
policing, and it streamlines the criminal justice process.  As to the former, 
recording interrogations purports to end swearing contests between defendants and 
police officers the effect of which is to smear the reputation of innocent police 
accused of illegal interrogation methods.  As to the latter, recording interrogations 
purports to promote prosecutions by short-circuiting meritless suppression 
hearings.  This, in turn, conserves public funds that “would have been consumed in 
resolving the disputes that arose over the events that occurred during 
interrogations.”40  In sum, recording custodial interviews helps preserve the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, both by saving scarce judicial resources and 
helping “to ascertain the truth.”41 
Alaska is the only state whose due process guarantee has been interpreted to 
require the recording of custodial interrogations.  Other states have stopped short of 
a constitutional requirement.  For example, Minnesota’s Supreme Court established 
an exclusionary rule much like Alaska’s but did so pursuant to its supervisory 
powers to ensure the fair administration of justice, requiring that all custodial 
questioning must be recorded where feasible.42  The reasons the Minnesota court in 
State v. Scales provided for the exclusionary rule were identical to those articulated 
in Stephan.43  Similarly, New Jersey’s Supreme Court established a committee, 
pursuant to its supervisory authority, “to study and make recommendations on the 
 
37. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1161. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1162. 
41. Id. at 1161.  See also id. at n.16 (quoting Garcia v. District Court, 589 P.2d 924, 930 (Colo. 
1979) (“The trial of a criminal case is not a game of fox and hounds in which the state attempts to outwit 
and trap a quarry.  It is, instead, a sober search for truth, in which not only the resources of the 
defendant, but those readily available to the state must be put to work in aid of that search.”)). 
42. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d. 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) 
43. See id. at 591 (believing recorded interrogations would reduce or eliminate factual disputes 
about the denial of a defendant’s constitutional rights during detention, enable a defendant to challenge 
misleading or false testimony, protect the state against meritless claims and discourage unfair and 
psychologically coercive police tactics). 
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use of electronic recordation of custodial interrogation.”44  After detailing the many 
sides of the debate—including “the obvious [due process] benefit derived from a 
recording that creates an objective, reviewable record,”45 the protections against 
self-incrimination and the right to counsel afforded defendants by assuring that 
waivers and custodial statements are knowing and voluntary,46 the improvement of 
“the overall quality of police work,”47 and “[t]he potential savings that recording 
may have on judicial resources”48—New Jersey’s highest court announced “[t]he 
proverbial ‘time has arrived’ . . . to evaluate fully the protections that electronic 
recordation affords to both the State and to criminal defendants.”49 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has crafted yet another alternative to 
an exclusionary rule.  In Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, the high court 
restrained from requiring the filming of all custodial interrogations. But, because of 
its view that “recording all interrogations would improve the efficiency, accuracy, 
and fairness of criminal proceedings,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
placed the burden on the prosecution for explaining to the jury why the 
interrogation was not filmed.  That burden is explained in a jury instruction. 
[W]hen the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant’s confession or statement 
that is the product of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place 
of detention . . . , and there is not a[] . . . recording of the complete interrogation, the 
defendant is entitled . . . to a jury instruction advising that the State’s highest court has 
expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and 
cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any recording of the 
interrogation . . . , they should weigh evidence of defendant’s alleged statement with 
great caution and care.  Where voluntariness is a live issue and the humane practice 
instruction is given, the jury should also be advised that the absence of a recording 
permits (but does not compel) them to conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to 
prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.50 
 
44. State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 547 (N.J. 2004).  That report has been published, see 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/cookreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2006, and its 
recommendations adopted almost entirely by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, see 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ notices/reports/recordation.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2006), resulting in 
the adoption of a procedural rule and the endorsement of model jury instructions regarding the 
recordation of custodial interrogations. 
45. Cook, 847 A.2d at 543. 
46. Id. at 542-43. 
47. Id. at 543. 
48. Id. at 544. 
49. Id. at 546-57.  Like Minnesota and New Jersey, New Hampshire’s Supreme Court has acted 
pursuant to the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over the state trial courts.  The rule it 
promulgated, however, is a recording rule not based on the state constitution or the outcome of 
committee recommendations.  In Barnett, the court held pursuant to its supervisory powers, that for 
recorded custodial statements to be admitted into evidence, the recording must be complete.  State v. 
Barnett, 789 A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001).  Motivating the Barnett court is the “inequity inherent in 
admitting into evidence the selective recording of a post-Miranda interrogation” and the relatively easy 
way to record (and review) the entire interrogation in order “to ensure the fair administration of justice.” 
Id.  For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.D(1). 
50. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533-534 (Mass. 2004).  The court explained this ruling in 
conclusion by judging the film the most reliable kind of evidence.  “[W]here the utilization of recording 
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This is a remarkably powerful jury instruction for the defense because, as the 
dissent in DiGiambattista says, it communicates to the jury “that the court has 
expressed a ‘preference’ for recording and that a finding of involuntariness [and 
thus, likely a judgment of acquittal] may be premised on the absence of one . . . .”51 
Other state courts have refrained from crafting new evidentiary rules or jury 
instructions, convening committees or expanding due process. These courts instead 
resort to moderate exhortation, “strongly recommend[ing], as a matter of sound 
policy, that law enforcement officers” record custodial interrogations,52 as 
Indiana’s highest court stated.  While discussing the police’s failure to record the 
custodial interrogation of a defendant who provided nine different accounts of his 
involvement in the crime, and who subsequently (at trial and on appeal) contested 
the circumstances and content of his confession, the Tennessee Supreme Court (no 
doubt speaking from experience) said  
“that electronically recording custodial interrogations would reduce the amount of 
time spent in court resolving disputes over what occurred during the interrogation.  As 
a result, the judiciary would be relieved of much of the burden of resolving these 
disputes.  In light of the slight inconvenience and expense associated with 
electronically recording custodial interrogations, sound policy considerations support 
its adoption as a law enforcement practice.”53   
This Tennessee court nevertheless goes on to say, “[h]owever, the determination of 
public policy is primarily a function of the legislature.”54  In like fashion, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court praised the value of recording interrogations: “[I]t will 
often help to demonstrate the voluntariness of the confession, the context in which 
a particular statement was made, and of course, the actual content of the 
statement.”55 But it declined to impose a new evidentiary rule on state law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system.  In all three of these examples 
(Indiana, Tennessee and Mississippi), each state supreme court discusses at 
significant length the perceived benefits to the criminal justice system of recording 
custodial interrogations (as those benefits are laid out in Stephan), but each also 
nonetheless refrains from changing the legal status quo, deferring to the legislative 
prerogative to do so.56 
 
is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement . . . and an officer has chosen not to record a 
particular interrogation, we think that it is only fair to point out to the jury that the party with the burden 
of proof has, for whatever reason, decided not to preserve evidence of that interrogation in a more 
reliable form, and to tell them that they may consider that fact as part of their assessment of the less 
reliable form of evidence that the Commonwealth has opted to present.”  Id. at 535. 
51. Id. at 537. 
52. Stoker v. Indiana, 692 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (Ind. 1998). 
53. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d. 759, 772 (Tenn. 2001). 
54. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195, 200-02 (Tenn. 2000)). 
55. Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988). 
56. Stoker, 692 N.E.2d at 1388-90; Godsey, 60 S.W.3d. at 771-72; Williams, 522 So.2d at 208.  
See also Commonwealth. v. Craft, 669 A.2d. 394, 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[T]he adoption of a rule 
requiring contemporaneous recording of custodial interrogation, for the reasons advanced by the Alaska 
and Minnesota Courts, to insure the proper administration of justice is one that either the Supreme Court 
or General Assembly should pronounce, not an intermediate appellate court . . . .”). 
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Although these courts were not speaking directly to their state legislatures, they 
might as well have been. Almost as certainly as if these decisions had ordered the 
implementation of an exclusionary rule, the legislatures of Indiana and Tennessee, 
along with sixteen other states across the country, are in the process of debating the 
benefits and burdens of implementing such a criminal justice directive along the 
same argumentative lines discussed in Stephan and Scales.57  These debates are 
discussed below. 
B.  LEGISLATION, PENDING AND PASSED 
The stated intentions of the passed and pending state legislation mirrors the 
reasoning of the state court decisions on the issue. 
Protect Defendants.  Many legislatures find that recording custodial 
interrogations (or in some cases, only confessions),58 will protect defendants’ rights 
generally.  Most of the time, the language in the proposed bills regarding this issue 
is general, but at the core is the specific belief that filming interrogations will deter 
coercive police tactics, which in turn will protect a defendant’s right to counsel and 
privilege against self-incrimination.59 
For example, Arizona’s legislature has proposed a bill requiring that absent the 
recording of any statement made by a juvenile during a detention, the statement is 
inadmissible.  The proposed bill is based on the following legislative findings: 
1.  Every year, many persons are jailed because of false confessions during custodial 
interrogations. 
2.  Interrogators do not have to use force to elicit confessions from juveniles. 
3.  Electronic recording of interrogations would protect the innocent and provide the 
best evidence against the guilty.60 
Florida’s proposed legislation requires the recording of all custodial 
interrogations (not only juvenile detentions) through an exclusionary rule.  In the 
absence of a “true, complete, and accurate electronic recording, the prosecution 
may rebut the presumption of inadmissibility through clear and convincing 
 
57. See infra Appendix for a complete list of pending and passed legislation. 
58. See infra Appendix. 
59. Commentators agree:  “By creating an objective record of the interrogation for both internal 
and external review, videotaping will restrain overzealous interrogators who might otherwise resort to 
techniques that overstep the bounds of legality, especially in light of high profile cases in which little or 
no evidence exists against the suspect.  Consequently, the videotaping of custodial interrogations will 
reduce police improprieties during interrogation.”  Leo, Miranda Impact, supra note 21, at 688.  The 
Innocence Project has issued a statement encouraging “law enforcement officials to adopt the practice of 
videotaping custodial interrogations as a way of preventing and identifying false confessions. . . . Such a 
record will improve the credibility and reliability of confessions, while protecting the rights of innocent 
suspects.”  The Innocence Project, False Confessions (2004), http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
causes/falseconfessions.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
60. H.R. 2614, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005), 2005 AS H.B. 2614 (Westlaw). 
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evidence” that, among other things, “[t]he statement was both voluntary and 
reliable” and “[l]aw enforcement officers had good cause not to electronically 
record all or part of the interrogation.”61  As support for this proposed bill, its 
authors have submitted factual findings to the effect that “many innocent persons 
are imprisoned and later released due to false confessions; there are many reasons 
innocent people confess ranging from coercion to mental illness; electronic 
recording of interrogations protects the innocent and provides the best evidence 
against the guilty.”62  This bill presumes that recording custodial statements will 
reduce the amount of false or coerced confessions (and thus will reduce the amount 
of due process violations) because it will minimize coercive police tactics during 
interrogation, and it will provide courts and advocates with objective evidence of 
coercion (or mental incompetence) after interrogation.63 
A bill introduced in New Hampshire’s legislature has a similar basis.  Its authors 
propose that custodial statements be inadmissible absent a “complete and 
authentic . . . recording, . . . of the statement and the interrogation in its entirety 
. . . .  Prior to the statement but during the recording the person is informed of the 
right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”64  The bill’s authors explain that the 
purpose of the law “is to enhance the quality of the prosecution of those who may 
be guilty while affording protection to the innocent.  It is intended to create a 
verbatim record of the entire custodial interrogation for the purpose of eliminating 
disputes in court as to what factually occurred during the interrogation.”65 
Promote Prosecution.  The above excerpts from state legislative factual proffers 
show that, in addition to protecting defendants’ constitutional rights, recording 
statutes also aim to promote the prosecution of criminals.66  Arizona and Florida 
legislators contend that recorded confessions provide “the best evidence against the 
guilty.”67  Nebraska’s proposed recording statute says that “electronically 
record[ed] admissions or statements [are] an effective way for the prosecution to 
meet its burden of demonstrating a free, knowing, and intelligent wavier of a 
person’s right to remain silent, to refuse to answer questions, to have an attorney 
present during such questioning . . . .”68  Rhode Island’s and New Hampshire’s 
legislative proposals are the most direct on this point:  “[The] legislative 
purpose . . . [of the recording of custodial interrogations] is to enhance the quality 
 
61. H.R. 1119, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1119 (Westlaw). 
62. Id. 
63. See also Illinois’ statute, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3930/7.2 (West 2005), the findings for 
which state “[t]he [recording] technology will . . . provide a better means for courts to review 
confessions of suspects with direct evidence of demeanor, tone, manner, and content of statements.” 
64. H.R. 636, 159th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2005), 2005 NH H.B. 636 (Westlaw). 
65. Id. 
66. Consider the technology called Nutcracker™ Interview Management System, marketed to 
police detectives across the country, as a way to “make detectives more effective during custodial 
interviews” implying the “nut” to “crack” is the guilty defendant.  See http://www.cardinalpeak.com/ 
products.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
67. H.R. 2614, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005), 2005 AS H.B. 2614 (Westlaw); H.R. 1119, 
2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1119 (Westlaw). 
68. H.R. 112, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2005), 2005 NE L.B. 112 (Westlaw). 
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of the prosecution of those who may be guilty . . . .”69 
The belief that recorded custodial interrogations will substantially reduce 
disputes about what occurred during detentions—i.e., what was said and whether 
confessions were made knowingly and voluntarily—underscores the legislative 
goal of promoting the prosecution of criminals.  As a Florida bill stated in an 
alternative proposal for a recording statute, 
[L]imited trial court resources are squandered in hearing on motions seeking to 
suppress statements made by criminal suspects who are given the opportunity to make 
such claims because no recordings of their interrogations exist. . . . Low-cost 
technology is now available in every jurisdiction to record each and every custodial 
interrogation of a criminal suspect, eliminating this gross waste of recourses and 
enhancing the reliability . . . of law enforcement.70 
Here, the purpose behind the proposed legislation is not only to protect 
defendants’ constitutional rights under state and federal law, but to enhance 
(indeed, streamline) the prosecution of criminals by showing for the judge and jury 
that the accused voluntarily and intelligently inculpated himself during custodial 
detention.  In this context, the recorded statements are believed to be the most 
reliable evidence of the conditions of the detention, of what was said during the 
interrogation, and of the defendant’s state of mind when making the statements. 
Preserve Public Confidence.  The third basis for the legislative proposals is to 
preserve or rehabilitate the reputation of law enforcement specifically, and the 
criminal justice system generally.71  Florida’s proposed bill says as much explicitly: 
“The [l]egislature finds that the reputations of countless hard-working law 
enforcement officers are needlessly attacked by criminal suspects who falsely claim 
the officers have violated the suspects’ constitutional rights . . . .”72  Tennessee’s 
bill has a similar goal:  to improve the relationship between the public and the 
police.  “It is the intention of the general assembly to reduce the risk of false 
confessions, to improve the administration of justice, and to better the relationship 
between law enforcement officers and the communities they serve.”73  Indeed, 
many of the above-quoted legislative statements can be understood in light of a 
 
69. H.R. 5349, 2005-06 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005), 2005 RI H.B. 5349 (Westlaw); H.R. 
636, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2005), 2005 NH H.B. 636 (Westlaw). 
70. H.R. 1169, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1169 (Westlaw) (requiring the 
recording of custodial interrogations only of suspects accused of capital felonies). See also H.R. 46, 
2005 Leg., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005), 2005 MD H.B. 46 (Westlaw) (“Recording the Miranda 
warnings at the start of an interrogation could reduce subsequent challenges based on a defendant’s 
allegation that law enforcement failed to properly advise of these rights.”). 
71. “Videotaping interrogations thus lends credibility to police work—especially in urban 
communities, such as Los Angeles, where police are likely to be distrusted by large segments of the 
population—by demonstrating to prosecutors, judges, and juries both the fairness of police methods and 
the legality of any statements they obtain.  Videotaping interrogations is also likely to improve the 
quality of police work and thus contribute to more professional and more effective interrogation 
practices.”  Leo, Miranda Impact, supra  note 21, at 683. 
72. H.R. 1169, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1169. 
73. H.R. 204, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005), 2005 TN H.B. 204 (Lexis); S.R. 108, 
104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005), 2005 TN S.B. 108 (Lexis). 
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general distrust of police tactics and a fear of wrongly accused or convicted 
defendants.74  Recording interrogations and confessions is believed to enhance 
confidence in law enforcement because filming ostensibly exposes previously 
secretive and guarded police procedures to public (or court) scrutiny. 
C.  ASSUMPTIONS 
The Miranda decision stated that “[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy.  
Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to 
what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”75  The innovation of filming 
interrogations and confessions purports to change this dynamic by bringing courts, 
advocates and juries into the interrogation room to see for themselves what 
happened and what was said between police officers and suspects.76  But how, 
exactly, does the filming of custodial detentions make them less private and the 
resultant confessions less coercive?  What assumptions about the nature of film and 
the act of filming render custodial statements more truthful or provide more 
information about the criminal suspect and the circumstances of the interrogation 
and the crime?  This section explores the assumptions behind the filming of 
interrogations and confessions. 
 
1. Film’s Transparency: Transparent in Access, Transparent in Meaning 
One dominant assumption is that a recording of a custodial interrogation is a 
window into the interrogation room.77  By this I mean that viewers of the filmed 
recording of the interrogation believe they are witnessing the events of detention 
and that therefore they better understand what those events mean.78  That is, if 
 
74. See, e.g., H.B. 46, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005), 2005 MD H.B. 46 (Westlaw) (implying 
that law enforcement sometimes fail to properly provide Miranda warnings and that recording statute 
may ameliorate the problems that stem from that failure).  The aim of rehabilitating the public 
perception of law enforcement officers is not necessarily because of intentional dishonesty of the police 
but against the backdrop of an understanding that “human memory is often faulty—people forget 
specific facts, or reconstruct and interpret past events differently.  It is not because a police officer is 
more dishonest than the rest of us that we . . . demand an objective recordation of the critical events.  
Rather, it is because we are entitled to assume that he is no less human—no less inclined to reconstruct 
and interpret past events in a light most favorable to himself—that we should not permit him to be a 
‘judge of his own cause.’”  Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a 
Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 242-43 (1977-78).  
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).  See also Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 
1161 (Alaska 1985) (“The difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the 
fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommunicado.”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
445). 
76. Indeed, the motivation behind the Miranda warnings, in some sense, is to minimize the 
coercive effects of the “privacy” (to some, “isolation”) to facilitate accurate and voluntary interviews 
between police and suspects. 
77. Here, and hereinafter, I am talking particularly about film recordings, as opposed to simply 
audio recordings. 
78. See, e.g., the promotional material for the Nutcracker™ Interview Management System, a 
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police misbehave and coerce a confession, or if a suspect is incompetent to waive 
his constitutional rights, the crucial line between a knowing and incompetent 
waiver, or between a coerced or voluntary confession, will be obvious to the viewer 
of the film.  Similarly, if the suspect tells a tall tale rather than the truth, or, if, 
within the bounds of the law, police elicit a confession, the difference between the 
truth and a lie, between a coercive or voluntary solicitation, will be knowable 
through the film.  These crucial distinctions will be so obvious, in fact, that 
challenges to the confession will be easily upheld or discarded based on watching 
the film of the interrogation. 
Consider the following from the New Jersey Supreme Court’s State v. Cook, one 
of the most thorough and sophisticated case analyses on this issue to date.  “A 
recording . . . provid[es] a more complete picture of what occurred. . . . [It] also 
provide[s] judges and juries with a more accurate picture of what was said, as 
words can convey different meanings depending on the tone of voice or nuance 
used.”79  Florida’s proposed bill repeats this mantra, explaining that recording the 
interrogation provides a “true, complete, and accurate” account of the custodial 
interview.80  Massachusetts goes a step further, anointing the filmed version of the 
custodial detention the most reliable form of evidence there is.81 
Law enforcement is perhaps the most effusive concerning the virtues of film’s 
purported transparency.82  “[R]ecordings enable us to replay past events in real-
time, and thus to have a far more accurate and complete understanding of what 
occurred than still pictures or oral recountings can provide.”83  A member of the 
Houston Police Department explains, “I like to capture the person’s own words, so 
we can’t be accused of changing what was said.  Video is an especially great tool, I 
 
digital video recording product for police, that exclaims, “Provides a crystal-clear record of exactly what 
was said during police interviews,” and, “Allows jury members to see exactly how the suspect looked 
and acted, before being cleaned up for court.”  See http://www.cardinalpeak.com/products.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2006).  Compare  NICHOLS, BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 121 (writing about nonfiction 
film and saying that “to re-present the event is clearly not to explain it”). 
79. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 543 (N.J. 2004).  See also Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 208 (Miss. 
1988) (recording helps to demonstrate voluntariness, context and content of statement).  See also 
Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (“[W]e suggest that videotape is protection for 
the accused.  If he is hesitant, uncertain, or faltering, such facts will appear.  If he has been worn out by 
interrogation, physically abused, or in other respects is acting involuntarily, the tape will corroborate 
him in ways a typewritten statement would not.”). 
80. H.R. 1119, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1119 (Westlaw). 
81. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 535 (Mass. 2004).  This case is all the 
more interesting because the circumstances under which the defendant confessed to the crime at issue 
(arson) involved the police lying to the defendant during the interrogation about possessing an 
inculpatory film of the defendant leaving the scene of the crime on the night of the fire.  Id. at  518.  
Apparently, the force of the filmic evidence against the defendant (however false) was sufficient to 
compel a confession to a crime which, the defendant alleges, he did not commit.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court in this case, for the second time, reversed the appellate court’s determination that the confession 
was made voluntarily and knowingly and sets aside the verdict of guilty, remanding the case to the trial 
court. 
82. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 6 (“Virtually every officer with whom we spoke, having 
given custodial recordings a try, was enthusiastically in favor of the practice.”). 
83. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 26. 
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love it. . . . Why not let what happened during an interrogation play out before the 
eyes of the jury?”84  Or, as one police chief said about film cameras in police 
cruisers, “You’re getting the real story. It’s a picture. It’s not, ‘He said. She said,’ 
or ‘I did. He did.’ You have the evidence in front of you.”85  In these cases, the 
speakers believe in film’s superlative ability to transparently reproduce the 
circumstances of the interrogation. 
A member of the Sacramento Sheriff’s office goes so far as to eschew the 
possibility that the filmed confession, because it is filmed, can ever be interpreted 
in more than one way.  “We like recording our interviews with suspects because 
later the jury may hear and see, via videotape, either their confession or their 
alibi. . . . The words and phrases of the suspects/defendants can be quoted without 
being questioned by a defense attorney, and if the suspect demonstrates how they 
[committed the crime], it is not up for subjective interpretation.”86  Other examples 
of this impulse abound in the literature.87 
In a statement, the irony of which was probably lost on the speaker, a member of 
the Colorado Sheriff’s Office in El Paso County says that recording “improves the 
image of the police in the eyes of the public.  They see the fallacies shown on 
television are not what happens in real life.”88 But what about film makes this 
officer think that film is more like “real life” than television?89  Why is this 
speaker’s critique of television’s reproduction of policing tactics and television’s 
 
84. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 7 (emphasis added). 
85. See Reid R. Frazier, Cameras Set to be Installed in Five Shaler Police Cruisers, TRIB. REV., 
Dec. 8, 2003, available at www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/tribnorth/news/s_168905.html 
(quoting Robert Amann, Chief of Pine-Marshall-Bradford Woods Police).  Or, as one lieutenant in the 
Denver police department said about electronic recordings of interrogations, “It’s a relatively 
unimpeachable documentary source.”  Adam Liptak, Taping of Interrogations Is Praised by Police, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, at A35.  Of course, film is impeachable in many different ways (by 
interpreting the film’s images, by learning of events not filmed that bear on the significance of the 
filmed content, to name a few).  See infra Part III for further examples. 
86. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 7-8.  But see STELLA BRUZZI, NEW DOCUMENTARY: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 18 (2000) [hereinafter BRUZZI] (discussing the Zapruder video of the JFK 
assassination, saying “[t]he ultimate, uncomfortable paradox of the Zapruder film as raw evidence is that 
the more it is exposed to scrutiny, with frames singled out and details digitally enhanced, the more 
unstable and inconclusive the images become.”); see also id. at 21 (“If pieces of unpremeditated archive 
as ostensibly uncontaminated and artless as Zapruder’s or Holliday’s [the Rodney King video] home 
movies can produce contradictory but credible interpretations, then the idea of the ‘pure’ documentary 
which theorists have tacitly invoked is itself vulnerable.”). 
87. A member of the El Dorado County California Sheriff’s office says, “A motion to suppress is 
a swearing match between the suspect’s word and the officer’s word.  Now we play the tape and the 
judge says, ‘It’s right there!  Motion denied.’”  Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 9.  Illinois’ legislation 
adds support to this kind of cut and dry judgment, explaining that a filmed recording of a custodial 
interrogation “provide[s] a better means for courts to review confessions of suspects with direct 
evidence of demeanor, tone, manner, and content of statements.”  20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3930/7.2 
(West 2005) (emphasis added). 
88. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 16. 
89. Of course, the distinction being made here is between documentary-like film and cops and 
lawyers television shows, such as “Law and Order” and “NYPD Blue.”  But what about the difference 
between documentary-like film and the nightly news?  The issue is one of expectation (which is a 
question of genre, and thus a question of what work “documentary-like” does) not that film inherently 
delivers up “real life” more than television. 
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capacity to shape and mold opinion not also a critique of film’s subjective content 
and malleable form?  How would these assessments of the legislative agendas and 
judicial judgments change given that “documentary [filmmaking] has always 
implicitly acknowledged that the ‘document’ at its heart is open to reassessment, 
reappropriation and even manipulation . . . .  The fundamental issue of 
documentary film is the way in which we are invited to access the ‘document’ or 
‘record’ through representation or interpretation, to the extent that piece of archive 
material becomes a mutable rather than a fixed point of reference.”90  All of these 
legal explanations of the benefit of filming custodial interrogations and confessions 
rely on a belief in film’s ability to transparently reproduce real life:  that film can 
transport its viewers to the interrogation room to see with their own eyes what 
transpired there.91  As Part II of this Article will explain, this understanding of film 
is a myth, established and perpetuated from its earliest moments as a public 
aesthetic. 
 
2. Film as the Moral, Objective Observer 
Another dominant assumption behind the case law and legislation is that the 
presence of the film camera in the detention room does not affect the interrogation 
except for the better by making it more truthful, more accurate and less coercive.  
The camera is presumed an unbiased and moral observer, an angel on the shoulder 
of the police keeping them honest.92  The camera is also, in this way, presumed a 
friend of the detained suspect, a good doctor to whom the suspect can reveal all his 
troubles without the need for posturing or fear of reprisals.  Although the police 
may pre-judge the suspect guilty, the belief is that the film does not pre-judge, it 
just reproduces the image of self and circumstance that is presented to it.  
Defendants will feel less threatened because this neutral observer ostensibly will 
prevent their words from being twisted and because the circumstances of their 
detention will be memorialized and fixed on film. 
New Jersey’s Supreme Court provides the most overt support for the belief that 
film sanitizes the custodial environment.  In recommending that a committee be 
established to study the use of film as a tool for criminal justice, the court states 
that recording interviews “may improve the overall quality of police work by 
providing law enforcement officials with the ability to monitor the quality of the 
interrogation process.”93  When discussing the protections provided by recording 
interrogations, this court also suggests that it enhances the reliability of 
confessions, presuming that suspects who confess are more truthful when they do 
 
90. Bruzzi, supra note 86, at 12. 
91. But see Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 540-42 (discussing the mistaken notion of 
film as a kind of unimpeachable eyewitness). 
92. “Officers and detectives who know they will be videotaped are more likely to prepare their 
strategies beforehand and to be more self-conscious about their conduct during questioning.”  Leo, 
Miranda Impact, supra note 21, at 683. 
93. State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 543 (N.J. 2004). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892401
SILBEY 3/7/2006  1:03:55 PM 
128 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [29:2 
so on film.94  A member of the Omaha, Nebraska police department echoed this 
sentiment, suggesting that film actually facilitates confessions.  “It works out great 
due to the fact that you do not have to write anything down, which can make the 
suspect nervous and clam up . . . they clam up more when you write a lot of notes 
during the interview.”95 
Law enforcement officers are astoundingly honest about the effects of film on 
their interrogation tactics and, subsequently, on the value of the statements elicited.  
“As the investigator, it keeps you in check, knowing the video may be seen by a 
judge or jury.”96  These same officers also praise the revelatory aspect of film, both 
for its effects on police tactics as well as its effects on public sentiment.  “The act 
of recording automatically brings with it the air of disclosure and avoids 
accusations of impropriety during the interview.”97  In other words, to law 
enforcement officials and courts, film affects the interrogation and confession only 
by keeping them both honest and accurate and represents the custodial interview 
without bias or partiality. 
But no film—not even documentary or observational cinema or evidence 
verité—are objective representations of reality. 
To be sure, some documentaries claim to be objective—a term that seems to renounce 
an interpretive role.  The claim may be strategic, but it is surely meaningless.  The 
documentarist, like any communicator in any medium, makes endless choices.  He 
selects topics, people, vistas, angles, lenses, juxtapositions, sounds, words.  Each 
selection is an expression of his point of view, whether he is aware of it or not, 
whether he acknowledges it or not.98 
Although films may certainly convey a sense of moral righteousness, this is 
because of the particular film’s point of view, which, as explained below in Part II, 
is constructed by and through the film’s art. 
 
3. Voluntary Speech Means Truthful Speech 
Yet another assumption behind the case law and legislation is that speaking 
voluntarily means speaking truthfully.  Knowing what was exactly said in the 
detention room helps reveal the mystery of the legal truth—the presumptive goal of 
 
94. Id. at 555 (citing People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 241-43 (Cal. 1997)). 
95. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 11. 
96. Id. at 16 (Kenwood, Michigan Police Department).  Of course, this supposed corrective effect 
of film on police interrogations can be perceived as intrusive.  See, e.g., Reid R. Frazier, Cameras Set to 
be Installed in Five Shaler Police Cruisers, TRIB. REV., Dec. 8, 2003, available at 
www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/tribnorth/news/s_168905.html (“Mannell [director of public 
safety in Cranberry, PA] said he was uncomfortable with some types of video cameras that are on from 
the time the key is turned in a car’s ignition.  ‘If you have them . . . running all the time, you’re turning 
(into) Big Brother.’”) (parenthesis in original). 
97. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 9 (Mesa, Arizona Police Department). 
98. BRUZZI, supra note 86, at 4 (citing ERIK BARNOUW, DOCUMENTARY: A HISTORY OF THE 
NON-FICTION FILM (1993)).  See also Menand, supra note 5, at 94 (discussing documentary filmmaker 
Frederick Wiseman’s films (“There may be a neutral style, but there is no neutrality.”)). 
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the criminal case—which is whether the defendant is criminally culpable or not.  
Here, the assumption is that seeing and hearing on film what was said correlates to 
knowing the truth of those words—whether the statement was made voluntarily and 
intelligently, and, more crucially, whether it corresponds to the “truth” of guilt or 
innocence that investigators seek to uncover.99 
The problems here are many.  First, the presence of film as a legal tool alters the 
constitutional analysis from one that protects the process—e.g., a privilege against 
self-incrimination and the right to counsel—into one in which truth alone is the 
touchstone.  In other words, the filmed interrogation, capable of review and 
analysis by advocates and a court, blesses the custodial statements the same way 
Miranda warnings do.  Confessions are admissible against the defendant but not 
because film per se preserves constitutional rights but because it ostensibly reveals 
the truth of the matter.  The analysis has therefore shifted from one that prioritizes 
individual integrity over his guilt or innocence (such that even if guilty, the state 
cannot force him to inculpate himself) to one that places truth above all else, such 
that if guilty, and the film shows it, few (if any) defendants will go free.  This is 
explained by film’s ability to reproduce what feels like reality (whereas Miranda 
warnings promised nothing of the kind100), which is perhaps film’s most alluring 
attribute in a system whose distinction is the punishment of those who are guilty 
and whose disgrace is the incarceration of the innocent.  Filming interrogations 
only furthers Miranda’s goals if it demystifies the due process analysis of custodial 
statements as knowing and voluntary.  Filming interrogations complicates the 
pursuit of due process—perhaps even subverts it—if it is mistakenly understood as 
transparently and objectively representing the truth of the matter. 
Second, film’s use as a legal tool frustrates the promise of due process if film is 
assumed capable of exposing the suspect’s genuine self. Here, the belief is that 
speaking voluntarily and knowingly about one’s self and one’s circumstances on 
film means speaking the truth about one’s self and one’s circumstance in general.  
Disregarding the rich literature on the psychology of false confessions,101 there is 
 
99. But see BRUZZI, supra note 86, at 16 (“[T]he truth that [a nonfiction film’s] frames can reveal 
is restricted to verisimilitude of image to subject; the non-fictional image’s mimetic power cannot 
stretch to offering a context or an explanation for the crude events on the screen, thus proposing two 
levels of truth: the factual images we see and the truth to be extrapolated from them.”); see id. 
(discussing the Zapruder film in this light, “[o]ne of the consistently complicating aspects of the 
Zapruder film is that it has been both ‘unimpeachable’ and ‘constantly open to multiple interpretations,’ 
an open series of images that can be used to ‘prove’ a multitude of conflicting or divergent theories 
about the assassination.  . . . [A]s an authentic record, it functions as incontrovertible ‘evidence,’ whilst 
as a text incapable of revealing conclusively who killed President Kennedy it functions as an 
inconclusive representation”). 
100. Although there are some aspects of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that are concerned 
with truth in the criminal justice context (e.g., assuming that absent coercion people will only speak the 
truth), much of the jurisprudence is about protecting the individual from the power of the state.  See, e.g, 
Leo, Miranda Impact, supra note 21, at 678 (“By elevating the form of legal process over the substance 
of legal outcomes, appellate courts have frequently lost sight of the underlying rationale of Miranda—
the prevention of compelled self-incriminating testimony.”). 
101. See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 139-190 (2003) (discussing false confessions and providing examples); 
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substantial literary and film scholarship that demonstrates the absence of any true 
or coherent self in language (be it written, spoken or filmic).102  We are constructed 
in and through language, and constructed differently each time we represent our 
experience.103  Importantly, this does not suggest (absurdly) that the person who 
confesses on film and who in fact committed the crime to which he confessed are 
sufficiently distinct to defend on that basis.  This suggests only that film does not 
enable its viewers to really know the person in front of the camera, even though it 
feels like it does, and that film is not uniquely exposing, even though it feels like it 
is.  Indeed, one’s identity on camera and through film (and therefore the way one’s 
filmed statements are interpreted) may be entirely different from one’s identity off-
camera. Film theory incorporates this critique into its understanding of film’s 
capacity to document lives and recreate lived experience.  It is time that law, when 
incorporating film into its endeavor, does, too. 
Examples abound of the third assumption that film can expose the “true self” of 
the person being filmed.  As regards hierarchization of truth over process, many of 
the legislative initiatives explain that filmed confessions are the “best evidence 
against the guilty,”104 suggesting, I assume, that if the confession is true, it is 
admissible and should be believed.  A central reason for passing recording statutes 
is to promote prosecutions, which, as I have explained, may have less to do with 
actual guilt and more to do with confessions as the most compelling evidence.105  
 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM 84-93 (1985) 
(same).  See also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice 
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997). 
102. See, e.g., KAJA SILVERMAN, THE SUBJECT OF SEMIOTICS 198 (1983) (explaining how film 
demonstrates what has always been implicit in writing, “the distance which separates the speaking 
subject from the spoken subject”); EMILE BENEVISTE, PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 223-230 
(Mary Elizabeth Meek trans., University of Miami Press 1971) (1966); JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS:  A 
SELECTION 1-7 (Alan Sheridan trans., Norton 1977) (1966) (challenging through psychoanalysis the 
concept of the coherent, unitary self by elaborating a theory of language and culture as based on the 
inevitability of shifting subject positions); LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY 1-61 (1984) 
(perception of coherent subjectivity maintained through state institutions perpetuates illusion of freedom 
and a true self in society); MICHEL FOUCAULT, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 145 (Luther H. Martin, 
Huck Gutman & Patrick H. Hutton eds., 1988) (noting a shift in society away from querying “what are 
we in our actuality?” to “what are we today?”); JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND:  PHASES IN 
DISPUTE 98-99 (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., University of Minnesota Press 1988) (1983) 
(challenging the idea of the autonomous subject by showing how the act of announcing oneself always 
presupposes prior enunciations and enunciators, none of which can claim to be originary); FREDERIC 
JAMESON, POST MODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 26-27 (1991) (describing 
postmodern schizophrenia as a realization that personal identity is the effect of an illusory temporal 
unification of past and future with one’s present and that “such active temporal unification is itself a 
function of language”). 
103. Colloquially, we say “we have many roles in life” (translated: we each have many 
identities—professor, spouse, mother and lawyer, for example), which are created and perpetuated by 
and through language and demeanor.  (For example, what I say and do as a wife (to and with my 
husband) should be understood in that context and not, crucially, in the context of what I say and do as a 
professor (to and with my students)). 
104. H.R. 1119, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), 2005 FL H.B. 1119 (Westlaw); H.R. 2614, 
47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005), 2005 AS H.B. 2614. 
105. The moniker “queen of proofs” (regina probatorium) comes from medieval continental 
Europe when confessions stood “at the very apex of the hierarchy of proofs required for the conviction 
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Courts and law enforcement officers repeat this call to truth above all else.  As the 
vanguard case Stephan v. State explained, “a recording will help trial and appellate 
courts to ascertain the truth.”106  Of course, this is not to imply that seeking the 
truth is not a goal of the criminal justice system. I add merely that when due 
process is subordinated to truth, in particular to the notion of a singular, morally 
objective truth (as primarily located in the state’s story), the pursuit of criminal 
justice appears detached from the social order it was designed to preserve, and 
lacks a basis in the individual dignity it was designed to protect.107 
As regards the belief in a film’s unique capacity to expose a person’s authentic 
self, studies have been commissioned to address the effect of film on a person’s 
demeanor and willingness to talk.  The findings are that “[t]here is little conclusive 
evidence to show that the use of videotape has any significant effect on the 
willingness of suspects to talk.  While some are willing to talk or even play to the 
camera, others are reluctant.”108  Police and prosecutors have used this finding to 
support their continued use of film in the interrogation room because “the majority 
of agencies that videotape found that they were able to get more incriminating 
information from suspects on tape than they were in traditional interrogations.”109  
If film is not a controlling factor in determining whether a suspect talks, it 
nevertheless appears to affect what a suspect says—i.e., the suspect appears to play 
to the camera, speaking more (whether or not truthfully) in its presence.  The 
inherent contradiction in this study is inoffensive only if both the “incriminating 
information” elicited from the police in the filmed interview and the suspect’s 
demeanor as represented on film is a fair and truthful representation of the 
suspect’s person and circumstance.  Otherwise, this finding suggests there are more 
 
of the criminal defendant.”  Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of Dealing with Unsatisfactory 
Fundamental Law: A Comparative Glance at the Different Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, 
Jewish Law and the United States Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REV. 535, 538-39 (citing EDWARD 
PETERS, TORTURE (1985)). 
106. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985).  See also Sullivan Report, supra note 
7, at 9 (“It can serve as a valuable tool to the criminal justice system, assisting the Court in the seeking 
of the truth.” ) (DuPage County, Illinois Sheriff’s Office). 
107. As criminal and constitutional scholar David R. Dow has written about death penalty 
jurisprudence and its representation in popular culture, “all this talk of innocence is a moral distraction.  
Death row is full of guilty men, but they are yet men: human beings who committed vile and despicable 
acts, yet still human beings.”  David R. Dow, Fictional Documentaries and Truthful Fictions: The Death 
Penalty in Recent American Film, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 552 (2000). 
108. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 22.  See also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 
516, 531 (Mass. 2004) (“The principal objection to recording of interrogations springs from the fear that 
suspects will refuse to talk at all, or will decline to make a full confession, if they know they are being 
recorded.  Based on experience to date in other jurisdictions, those fears appear exaggerated.”); See also 
William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN 
BRIEF (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C.), March 1993, at 1, 6 (suspects are no less likely to confess in 
the presence of an electronic recording device). But see Leo, Miranda Impact, supra note 21, at 685-86 
(suspects may be reluctant to speak candidly in front of camera); Major Joshua E. Katzenberg, A Three-
Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession 
Defenses Before the Trier of Fact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 783, 812 (2003) (recording interview can 
stymie interrogation because suspects may be more willing to talk when what is said is perceived as 
private as only between themselves and officers). 
109. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 22 (emphasis added). 
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actors in the precinct house than one would think or hope.   
This San Diego prosecutor’s explanation of the value of filming confessions 
makes this point, clarifying the impulse as a mistaken belief in film’s revelatory 
capacity rather than its play to the poser in all of us: “Consider . . . the 
immeasurable value of giving the eventual jury the opportunity to hear, if not see, 
the defendant before he has thought to temper his attitude, clean up his 
language . . . and otherwise soften his commonly offensive physical appearance, 
and you begin to appreciate the tremendous value of a taped interview. . . . Not 
even Richard Gere [as the defense lawyer in the motion picture Chicago] will be 
able to tap dance his way around the truth that an audio or videotape recording so 
obviously displays.”110 
As Professor Jennifer Mnookin has written recently about the two films that 
followed the murder trials of the so-called West-Memphis Three, Paradise Lost: 
The Murders at the Robin Hood Hills111 and Paradise Lost 2: Revelations,112 
 
[T]hey offer a fascinating case study in the effects of observation, or, more 
specifically, in the ways that the making of a documentary can affect the matters 
being observed.  That observers affect what they watch is practically axiomatic; the 
very presence of the camera may change what is seen. . . .  But the issues raised . . . go 
well beyond the ordinary and familiar (though nonetheless important) questions about 
how the presence of cameras may change the dynamics of, say, the courtroom.  In 
fact, the trial itself and the films that depict it turn out to be mutually constituted to an 
extraordinary degree, and tracing out these interconnections can provide a significant 
object lesson in the way that the media mediates and creates what it represents.113 
Few if any of the court cases, and none of the legislative findings, consider how 
the camera mediates, or otherwise affects, the interrogation and its subjects being 
filmed (except to sanitize the environment, making it less coercive and therefore 
 
110. Id. at 12-13 (brackets in original).  The reference to a fiction film based on a true story as an 
example of what is not going on in the interrogation room is profoundly ironic, although, I gather, not 
intended by the prosecutor making the statement.  Is there not an affinity between films of custodial 
interrogations (the film and the way it is used in court) and the genre of Hollywood “truth tales” (films 
based on true crime, such as SWOON (American Playhouse 1991) or COMPULSION (20th Century Fox 
1959))?  Aren’t both films (the police film and a Hollywood film) versions of a recounting of the crime 
and the legal process that followed?  Don’t both films explain the crime or justify the legal outcome?  
Don’t both films refer to facts beyond the film frame to authenticate its story as being based on historical 
events?  For further discussion of “truth tales” and their relation to documentary filmmaking, see 
Jennifer Mnookin & Jessica Silbey, Truth Tales and Trial Films (Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
111. PARADISE LOST: THE MURDERS AT THE ROBIN HOOD HILLS (Home Box Office 1996). 
112. PARADISE LOST 2: REVELATIONS (Home Box Office 2000). 
113. Jennifer Mnookin, Reproducing a Trial: Evidence and Its Assessment in Paradise Lost, in 
LAW ON THE SCREEN 154-55 [hereinafter Mnookin] (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, Martha Merrill 
Umphrey eds., 2005).  Mnookin describes this precise effect on one of the unindicted suspects in the 
case of the West Memphis Three.  “[John Mark] Byers is asked why he behaves differently when the 
cameras are pointed in his direction.  He is accused of being nice to the advocates of the West Memphis 
Three whenever the cameras are off and changing completely when he is on film. Which Byers is the 
‘real’ one?  He refuses to answer, responding ‘I guess it’ll stay a mystery.’”  Id. at 185-86. 
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according to the state, more truthful).  That there is some constitutive effect—that 
the camera makes a substantive difference in what is seen (and therefore what is 
known and how it is understood) is “axiomatic”—and yet it is ignored by the legal 
actors and criminal justice processes making use of film. 
D.  CASES AND PROBLEMS 
These three assumptions—film’s transparency, its moral objectivity and its 
capacity to expose the so-called true identity of the person being filmed—manifest 
in the case law analyzing the admissibility of the confessions themselves.  
Specifically, these assumptions arise in the context of two rules of admissibility, 
regarding (1) completeness of the statement and (2) competence of the speaker. 
This section draws on several court cases to demonstrate the problem with these 
assumptions. 
1. Rule of Completeness 
The rule of completeness generally requires that a recorded custodial statement 
may be admitted only if complete and available for review by the court and 
opposing counsel.114  A primary reason for the rule is to prevent misleading courts 
and juries when “portions of a statement are taken out of context.”115  In the 
criminal context, the rule has been interpreted to be “protective, merely.  It goes 
only so far as is necessary to shield a party from adverse inferences, and only 
allows an explanation or rebuttal of the evidence received.”116 
There are two problems that arise in the application of this rule to the cases 
considering the admission of filmed custodial statements, both of which implicate 
the above three assumptions about the perceived nature of filmic recordings. 
a.  Incomplete Films 
First, there are a handful of cases that discuss faulty or intermittent use of film 
technology (surely a ubiquitous problem).  The camera was turned on and off 
several times during the interrogation (at strategic or random points); it broke half-
way through the interrogation or it was turned on only toward the end of the 
interrogation.  In these circumstances, the court has to evaluate whether the 
 
114. This common law rule has been codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 
106 (“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party 
may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”).  As applied in the context of 
filmed interrogations, see, e.g., State v. Ayer, 834 A.2d 277, 293 (N.H. 2003) (“In order to admit into 
evidence the taped recording of an interrogation . . . the recording must be complete.”); Stephan v. State, 
711 P.2d 1156, 1164 (Alaska 1985); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 544 (N.J. 2004). 
115. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 n.14 (1988). 
116. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. 
Corrigan, 168 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir. 1948)); see also Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail 
Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The rule of completeness . . . functions as a 
defensive shield against potentially misleading evidence proffered by an opposing party.”). 
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admission of only portions of the interview violates the rule of completeness.  As 
might be expected, the defendant routinely charges in such circumstances that the 
scenes missing from the film of the interrogation would demonstrate a coercive 
atmosphere or would put into favorable light the inculpatory statements sought to 
be admitted by the prosecution. 
The case of Taylor v. State exemplifies this problem.  In Taylor, defendant 
Latashia Michelle Taylor was convicted of killing Brandee Whitehead while 
kidnapping his infant child.117  Taylor was convicted primarily because of the 
admission of her confession following a lengthy interrogation.  Taylor appealed the 
denial of several motions to suppress her confession on the basis, among others, 
that it was involuntary.  Specifically, she contended that one of her interrogators, 
Police Captain Ezell, threatened and intimidated her and that it was only after the 
“tougher tone” of Ezell (as opposed to the other police officers) that Taylor 
confessed.  The interrogation was filmed almost in its entirety, except for the time 
when Ezell was in the detention room with Taylor. 
On appeal, Taylor argued that regardless of whether there was deliberate 
interference with the camera, her confession should have been suppressed, because 
had the court seen her interview with Captain Ezell, it would have agreed that her 
confession was unconstitutionally coerced.  Without the missing scenes from the 
film, Taylor implied, the confession should not have been admitted. 
The facts surrounding the filming of Taylor’s interrogation are fishy, to say the 
least.  First, the videotape was turned on at “some undetermined time.”118  The 
camera then was turned off (either deliberately or by accident) when Ezell entered 
the room for the first time, just after he is heard saying to Taylor, “I’m going to 
explain some things here.”119  The camera restarted “moments later capturing [the 
other interrogator’s] continuing . . . interview of Taylor”120 without Ezell.  Ezell 
entered the interrogation room a second time on his Chief’s instructions in order to 
“tell [Taylor] to quit lying.”121  This, too, was not caught on camera.  According to 
Ezell’s testimony, when “he went into the interrogation room, [he] ‘assumed’ that 
the video camera was still running.  [He] did not know what had caused the camera 
to turn off [again].”122  The Chief of Police testified on Ezell’s behalf, saying that 
earlier “he [had] attempted to adjust the focus of the camera because the picture on 
the monitor had become unfocused.  Once Ezell returned from the interrogation 
room, . . . Ezell pointed out [to the Chief] that ‘he didn’t think the camera was 
running.’ . . .  [The Chief] stated that he did not intentionally turn the camera off, 
and he had ‘no idea’ how it had been turned off . . . .”123 
In affirming the trial court’s admission of Taylor’s confession despite the lack of 
complete record, the court relies on testimony from the other officers present 
 
117. Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787, 789 (Miss. 2001). 





123. Id. at 790-91 
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during the interrogation.124  “We agree with the trial court’s finding that testimony 
at the hearing adequately supplemented the missing portion of the tape and that 
Taylor’s propensity to make a confession was not affected by Ezell’s raising of his 
voice or the use of profanity.”125  In reaching this conclusion, the court says that it 
believed a testifying officer’s statement (corroborated by subsequent film footage 
after Ezell left the room) that “Taylor didn’t appear to be scared when Ezell left the 
interrogation room, but that Taylor exhibited the same demeanor of calm and that 
Taylor stuck to her story . . . for quite sometime.”126 
The irony in this ruling is manifold.  First, the rule of completeness is to prevent 
precisely the kind of alleged prejudice at issue here.  Where auxiliary statements 
not admitted will clarify or add context to admitted evidence, the rule of 
completeness counsels their admission or risk reversible error.  Second, a central 
reason for filming custodial interrogations is the benefit of presumptively seeing 
with one’s own eyes the exact circumstances the defendant contends renders the 
statements involuntary in order to most effectively protect a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.  A film of the entire interrogation is presumed the most 
reliable of evidence.  But here, where a partial film of Taylor’s interrogation and 
subsequent confession is admitted against her (the part that only helps the police 
and hurts the defendant), and where the part of the film missing is precisely that 
which she claims will show the coercion that renders her statements involuntary, 
the purposes of the evidentiary rule and of the camera’s presence are turned on their 
head.  Nevertheless, the court admitted the partial film as evidence of the 
interrogation’s impartiality.  And it resolved a swearing match between the officers 
and the defendant, which the filming of interrogations was intended to prevent,127 
by finding the police officers more credible than the defendant on precisely the 
issue of coercion and without the (presumptively) most reliable evidence on the 
issue.  Under these circumstances, how, if at all, does the film (its use and its 
interpretation) further the legislative purposes for which filmmaking in the precinct 
house was instituted? 
b.  Too Complete Films 
The rule of completeness as concerns the admissibility of filmed interrogations 
gives rise to yet another problem: what happens when a filmed interrogation 
admitted in its entirety contains statements made by the police lying to suspects 
linking them to the crime or discussing uncharged acts of misconduct?  In these 
circumstances, the issue is not that the film is incomplete, it is that the admitted 
evidence (the entire film) is too complete.  It contains prejudicial and irrelevant 
statements that are not otherwise admissible and practically impossible to rebut.128 
 
124. Id. at 796. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 791 (quotations omitted; brackets in original). 
127. Sullivan Report, supra note 7, at 9. See also Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 
1985); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 544 (N.J. 2004). 
128. “[R]aw videotape may include testimony that is inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, forcing 
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For example, in State v. Cordova,129 the filmed custodial interview, which was 
admitted into evidence at trial, contained untrue statements from the officer that he 
was an expert in detecting deception.  Cordova argued at trial and on appeal that 
including the portions of the film in which the officer falsely states “he has gone to 
school for many years to learn how to detect lies, that he is an expert in deception 
detection and that, therefore, he knows Cordova is lying” was prejudicial and 
reversible error.130  The trial court allowed the entire film into evidence on the basis 
that the officer’s statements were necessary to give context to Cordova’s statements 
(i.e., applying the rule of completeness) and because Cordova could call the officer 
to examine his qualifications.131  But, of course, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
prohibit an expert witness from testifying absent qualifying as one.132  And, further, 
testimony regarding a person’s credibility (whether expert testimony or not), is 
prohibited unless admissible under the limited rubric of character evidence.133  In 
this context, these errors are particularly troubling given that the officer was 
lying—he wasn’t actually an expert at all.  How does showing the film with the 
false statements to the jury do anything but provide damaging “context” to 
Cordova’s incriminating statements?  How do the police’s false statements 
(whether or not understood as such by the jury) help clarify the accuracy and 
voluntariness of Cordova’s confession?  This Idaho appeals court recognized the 
trial court’s error, concluding that the “officer’s comments that he is an expert in 
deception detection are not necessary to give context to Cordova’s answers.  The 
officer’s comments . . . are not connected to a question, but instead made as a 
statement to Cordova.  Those comments could have been easily redacted without 
harming the context of Cordova’s later admissions.”134  It nonetheless ruled the 
admission of the entire film harmless.135 
The contrast between the rulings at the trial and appellate level highlights 
several dilemmas. Whereas the purpose of admitting the filmed confession in its 
entirety is to satisfy the rule of completeness, and the purpose of filming the 
confession in the first place is to provide a comprehensive context for evaluating 
 
the court to become a video-editor and leaving the jury with a perplexing and incomplete version of the 
interrogation.”  Matthew Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice, at 46 
(February 14, 2005) (unpublished student paper originally posted on Student Scholarship Series website, 
Yale Law School) (on file with the author). 
129. State v. Cordova, 51 P.3d 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
130. Id. at 453. 
131. Id. 
132. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise . . . .” ). 
133. FED. R. EVID. 608(a); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“Testimony regarding a witness’s credibility in prohibited unless it is admissible as character 
evidence.”); United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Under the Federal Rules, 
opinion testimony on credibility is limited to character; all other opinions on credibility are for the jurors 
themselves to form.”). 
134. Cordova, 51 P.3d at 455. 
135. Id. at 456. 
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the voluntariness and accuracy of the confession, the appeals court said that the 
redaction of the film would have been the better route.  Indeed, instead of implying 
that the film provides the most thorough and accurate perspective on the 
interrogation and confession—the film is often compared to a window into the 
detention room and into the suspects’ state of mind, the appeals court encouraged 
redaction (a form of film editing) indicating that the optimum evidence of 
truthfulness and accuracy is not the “whole story” but only part of it.  “[A]n 
interrogator’s comments that he or she believes the suspect is lying are only 
admissible to the extent that they provide context to a relevant answer by the 
suspect.  Otherwise, interrogator comments that result in an irrelevant answer 
should be redacted.”136  As a general principle, this is not surprising given that 
“redacting” evidence—e.g., not admitting it or limiting its applicability—is what 
trial courts do all the time. What is surprising is the court’s encouraging of the 
redaction of the film when the underlying rationales of using film as a legal tool is 
its supposed comprehensive quality.137 
But why encourage redaction when film is believed to depict what, in fact, 
happened in the detention room:  what words were spoken, in what manner and 
when?  If film is as transparent and objective and as much of a moral observer as 
the case law and legislation intimate, why are redactions necessary at all?  Indeed, 
don’t redactions corrupt the otherwise transparent and objective story being told 
through film?  In the case of State v. Cordova, one could argue that the deception 
arose most overtly from the police officer, not from the film. 
2. Rule of Competence 
A third set of cases that consider the admissibility of filmed confessions turn on 
a different rule of evidence:  the rule of competence.  For the defendant’s 
inculpatory statements to be admitted against him, he must be competent to have 
waived his Miranda rights and he must have thereafter spoken knowingly and 
voluntarily under a “totality of the circumstances.”138  Here, the issue for the court 
is not whether or not the film is sufficiently complete (or too complete) to prevent a 
suspect’s statements from being taken out of context, but whether, in the first 
instance, the defendant as seen on film can be adjudged competent to have 
 
136. Id. at 455. 
137. For other cases that evince this problem, see, e.g., State v. Delconte, No. COA03-462, 2004 
WL 1824227, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004) (holding it was harmless error to admit filmed 
statements containing references to uncharged acts of misconduct); State v. Midgett, 680 N.W.2d 288, 
290-93 (S.D. 2004) (holding it was reversible error to permit a jury to review an entire film of custodial 
interrogation when the entire film was not admitted into evidence).  These cases are similar to Cordova.  
In both cases, the courts encourage redaction of the film and hold it was error (whether or not harmless) 
to admit the entire film, suggesting that partial films can be better than whole films and implying such a 
meaningful distinction exists. 
138. “[T]he ultimate question whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged 
confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for 
independent federal determination.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-04 (2000) (quoting Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)) (emphasis omitted). 
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voluntarily and knowingly inculpated himself while discussing the circumstances 
of the crime for which he was accused. 
In most cases, the issue of competency concerns mental acumen and its 
degradation due to some combination of coercive conditions, youth, illness, alcohol 
or drugs.  Prior to the filming of confessions, mental competency, though decided 
by the trial court, was an issue informed by the testimony of experts, often based on 
an expert’s interview with the defendant.139  Where confessions are filmed, 
however, competency becomes an issue for the court based on its assessment of the 
defendant’s appearance on film.  In other words, by and large, judges as film critics 
supplant scientific experts.140  The film viewing takes the place of (or, in many 
cases trumps) the result of the medical or psychological interview.  In these cases, 
the assumption is that the film unambiguously conveys the defendant’s competence 
(or lack thereof) without a need for (or even when contrary to) previously routine 
expert testimony.  But what about the film turns the judge into an expert on mental 
capacity?  What about the filmed interrogation improves on (to the point of 
replacing) the medical expert’s testimony? 
Consider the case against Kenneth Gray, a juvenile (just over sixteen years of 
age) charged and convicted as an adult of second degree murder and of burglary.141  
Gray was interviewed several times over the course of several days, sometimes in 
the presence of his mother and sometimes alone.142  During one of the interviews 
(without his mother), he became “increasingly nervous” (according to an 
interviewing officer) and subsequently confessed to breaking a window, entering 
the victim’s home and, when the victim returned home unexpectedly, shooting him 
dead.143  It was only after this confession that the defendant agreed to have his 
inculpatory statement videotaped.  Juvenile Miranda warnings were provided but 
were not filmed.144  On appeal, Gray asserts that his confession was neither 
intelligently nor voluntarily given because, among other things, he was only sixteen 
years old, had an IQ of only 73 and was taking medication for depression, anxiety 
and attention deficit disorder that interfered with his judgment.145 
The trial court and appellate court rejected Gray’s challenge. According to 
appellate court, the defendant had some familiarity with the criminal justice system 
already (through juvenile officers at his school), and he was therefore more savvy 
than most young men his age concerning the interrogation procedure.  The court 
also considered Gray to be sufficiently competent because he terminated the 
custodial interviews several times “by telling [the officers] ‘he didn’t want to talk 
anymore.’”146  According to this court, this “hardly bespeaks a person so 
 
139. See, e.g, United States v. Aripa, No. 97-30071, 1997 WL 787487, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 
1997); State v.  Setser, 932 P.2d 484, 486 (N. M. 1996). 
140. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 522-26, 557-61. 
141. State v. Gray, 100 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
142. Id. at 884-85. 
143. Id. at 885. 
144. Id. at 885-86. 
145. Id. at 886. 
146. Id. at 887. 
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unsophisticated, unintelligent, and uninformed that he could not understand the 
context of what was occurring.”147  The appeals court next explained away the 
defendant’s low scores on the juvenile aptitude tests, (which showed Gray to be in 
the borderline range of intellectual development (IQ of 73 to 75)), by pointing to 
slightly higher verbal IQ scores (78 to 84) and suggesting that the anxiety of test-
taking impacted negatively on Gray’s testing performance.148 
This last conclusion conflicted with the court’s other determination:  that Gray’s 
medication successfully calmed his nerves and treated his anxiety and panic 
attacks.  Gray’s mother stated (and her testimony was uncontroverted) that 
defendant’s medications were “‘too strong [for] him’ and made him ‘light-headed 
and [caused] dizzy spells.’”149  But the court concluded that the medicines seem to 
be working as they should, without the alleged side-effects, because “there [was] no 
evidence [Gray] was experiencing those problems while being interrogated. . . . 
[T]he evidence supports a finding that Defendant’s medicines aided him in making 
an intelligent, understanding, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, 
rather than impairing his ability to do so.”150  The court drew this conclusion 
despite the evidence from Gray that during the interrogation he felt “[s]cared.  
Nervous. . . . [P]anicked.”151 
The inconsistencies in the documentary and testimonial evidence regarding 
Gray’s state of mind did not concern the court, however, because the videotaped 
confession said it all.  The defendant’s “overt performance during the videotaped 
confession, does not bespeak a person of such ‘dull’ intellect that he was incapable 
of understanding his rights.”152  “The videotape reveals Defendant was physically 
mature, and his demeanor belies his claim that his confession was ‘the product of 
ignorance of rights’ and of ‘adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.’”153  Although the 
court acknowledged that “[d]efendant appears to cry or sob occasionally during the 
videotaped statement,”154 it nevertheless concluded that “[t]he videotape alone is 
persuasive evidence that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile 
Miranda rights.”155  In sum, this court asked that we disregard the contrary 
evidence of test scores, youth and unrefuted diagnoses of panic and attention deficit 
disorders, and instead that we trust the court and its interpretation of the film of the 
defendant as calm, knowing and intelligently presenting himself and his role in the 
crime under investigation. 
Like many other courts who are faced with a film of an interrogation or 
confession, on the one hand, and scientific (or other documentary) evidence 
suggesting involuntariness or incompetence, on the other, this court fell prey to the 
 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 888. 
149. Id. at 888-89 (some brackets in original). 
150. Id. at 889. 
151. Id. at 890. 
152. Id. at 888 (quotations in original). 
153. Id. at 891. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. (emphasis added). 
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lure of film’s ideological reproduction of reality.156  Why did the court go to such 
lengths to describe the parts of the defendant’s interrogation that were not on 
film—a description that goes on for five pages of the opinion—only to conclude 
that “[t]he videotape alone is persuasive evidence that Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his juvenile Miranda rights”?157  Why did the court catalogue 
Gray’s juvenile record—“fighting with a school principal, disrupting classes, 
causing fights”158—when none of it relates to the kind of custodial interrogation 
Gray experienced in these circumstances?  What is the purpose of elucidating the 
defendant’s illnesses—his various hospitalizations, his diagnoses and his 
treatment—if not to undermine the court’s ultimate finding that the defendant’s 
mental handicap failed to render his interrogation constitutionally infirm?159  How 
do Gray’s awkward and inconsistent responses to the officer’s questions evidence 
what the court comprehends as Gray’s sophistication and “familiarity with the 
criminal justice system”?160  (At first, Gray said “he didn’t want to talk any 
more.”161  Later, after being Mirandized, he agreed to waive his rights and he 
answered questions, declaring he “did not want Mother present.”162  Still later, he 
asked for his mother before continuing further and refused to consent to gun 
powder residue tests.163) 
One reason for the rich detail, I suggest, is to underscore the court’s impression 
that it truly got to know Kenneth Gray.164  Although none of these details are 
 
156. See the discussion of ideology of film infra at Part II.A.  For other like cases, see, e.g.,  State 
v. Pinkston, No. 89502, 2004 WL 2160677, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2004) (affirming trial court’s 
admission of videotaped confession despite defendant’s claims of being under the influence of 
marijuana during interrogation and his confession therefore involuntary because from the videotape “[i]t 
did not appear to me [the court] that [defendant] was high, and I don’t know because I don’t know him 
from the past, but it did not appear to me that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  He signed 
the waiver.”); Warner v. Commonwealth., No. 2003-CA-000452-MR, 2004 WL 1046367, at *1 (Ky. Ct. 
App. May 7, 2004) (denying funds for psychiatric evaluation regarding mental state of defendant to 
determine voluntariness of confession on the basis that “it was apparent” from “videotape of 
[defendant’s] confession” that he “was ‘of normal or above normal intelligence’”); Baird v. State, 849 
So.2d 223, 233 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming admission of confession despite claim of intoxication 
(Xanax) and coercion on the basis of trial court’s viewing of videotaped confession that revealed 
nothing “on there about anybody being coerced or tricked”); State v. Campbell, 738 N.E.2d 1178, 1195 
(Ohio 2000) (affirming trial court’s finding that defendant was not intoxicated when confessing to 
charged crime, despite having recently drunk at least forty ounces of beer, which finding was based on 
“trial court’s viewing of the videotape, which showed ‘no indication whatsoever’ of intoxication”); 
Foster v. Kansas, No. 99-3157-DES, 2002 WL 13785, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 2, 2002) (affirming trial 
court’s refusal to admit evidence that defendant was “immature, and easily manipulated” and that “his 
demeanor on the videotape [on which he confesses to charged crime] was not his usual demeanor” on 
the basis that the videotape “provides clear evidence of its voluntary nature and fails to disclose any 
evidence that the confession was coerced”). 
157. Gray, 100 S.W.3d at 891. 
158. Id. at 887. 
159. Id. at 888. 




164. Another reason is to narrate the film, and by doing so, to render the court’s conclusion of 
voluntariness and competence inevitable.  See infra Part II.A.2 for an analysis of film narrative in this 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892401
SILBEY 3/7/2006  1:03:55 PM 
2005] FILMMAKING IN THE PRECINCT HOUSE 141 
caught on film, when reading the opinion (and certainly, when the court views the 
film after having already heard all this other evidence), one gets the sense that to 
the court the film is the ultimate and best source of its insight into Kenneth Gray: 
his motivation, his aptitude, his demeanor and his truthfulness.  The court’s final 
statement on the issue before it—“the videotape alone is persuasive evidence”—
masks the fact that little, if any, of the evidence the court discussed concerning 
Gray’s competence came from the film itself.  And yet, the film is the best 
evidence, according to this court, of the fairness of the custodial interrogation and 
the truthfulness of his confession.165 
This court’s conclusion only makes sense if this film is understood as a window 
into the person of Kenneth Gray—that, despite evidence to the contrary, the film 
reveals Gray’s true self:  a street-wise youth, sharp-witted and poised beyond his 
sixteen years.  This Missouri court believed it could see in the film of Gray’s 
confession (though, crucially, not a film of the entire interrogation) an innate 
competence in Gray as he told the story of what happened during the burglary.  I 
believed that the film revealed to its audience a mature person who not only knew 
what he was saying but did what he said he did—that is, commit armed burglary 
that resulted in the victim’s death. In this way, as much as the court’s opinion is 
about Gray’s competence, it is also about Gray’s guilt.  The details of the 
interrogation rehearsed at length by the court appear to justify both the charge and 
the conviction by telling the story of a young man who had the requisite criminal 
capacity to be charged and convicted as an adult.  To this court, the film of Gray 
confessing to the crime revealed a person through his own words, the confession 
serving as a kind of security blanket, conferring confidence on the court to affirm 
the judgment below.166  The court was confident in its judgment of Gray as a 
person competent to inculpate himself in the most serious of crimes because the 
film feels uniquely revelatory.  To the court it was therefore secondary that the film 
also seems to confirm that Gray confessed of his own volition and that his 
judgment was not clouded by medication or immaturity.   
 
*  *  * 
As manifested in the application of evidentiary rules, these assumptions about 
film—its transparency, its moral objectivity, and its capacity to expose the truth of 
the person being filmed—are unsustainable after even a cursory study of film 
 
case. 
165. See also State v. George, 855 So. 2d 861, 872 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“The saying that a picture 
is worth a thousand words applies to this case.  As did the trial court, we have reviewed defendant’s 
videotaped confession in light of his claims that the statement should have been suppressed because he 
was hungry, thirsty and exhausted when he was questioned. . . . The trial court’s conclusion that 
defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given is fully supported by the evidence.”). 
166. In discussing the problematic nature of confessions, Mnookin writes, “a confession appeases 
our anxieties about our own responsibility for the judgment of guilt; when the guilty party admits 
culpability, the declaration of guilt becomes his rather than ours; we passively concur with his own 
judgment of himself rather than making an independent judgment about his guilty.  A confession makes 
it psychologically easy for us to hold him responsible, both for the act to which he confesses and for the 
act of confession itself.”  Mnookin, supra note 113, at 161. 
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history and theory.  Indeed, the puzzles posed by the case law in which these 
assumptions are manifest—the dilemma of film’s restricted frame (in time and 
space) and of its simulated revelation of the defendant and his crime as they really 
are—are not puzzles at all when film is understood as representation, as a 
particular kind of language (a semiotic system) with its own codes and signs that 
create and reproduce meaning.  The principal legislative and judicial grounds for 
filming custodial interrogations and confessions (to protect defendants, promote 
prosecutions and preserve public confidence in the criminal justice system) pervert 
the correct understanding of film as an art form, one that inherently problematizes 
the relationship between sight and knowledge, witnessing and judging.  Although 
the case law and recording statutes imply that filming what “really happened” in 
the precinct house is a cure-all for involuntary and false confessions, the history of 
film making and viewing counsels the opposite. 
As the next Part will show, film—even documentary film—records only one 
version of the lived reality; film is “put together” (from the Latin “fictio” or 
“fingere”) and constructed from lived experience.  Because of this, one can no 
better “see” the competence of the suspect or the coercion by the interrogators than 
one can judge the confession knowing and voluntary based on all the other 
evidence of record.  It is the ideology of film—that it exposes a fixed and 
determinable reality to us—that mistakenly emboldens courts and legislatures to 
assert that “what really happened” is obvious when seen on film as opposed to 
when described in sworn testimony. 
II.  DOCUMENTARY FILM 
This second Part aims to establish a limited contention from a vast body of film 
theory and history and to demonstrate its relevance to the legal analysis of filmed 
interrogations and confessions. This Part shows how contemporary documentary, 
including filmmaking in the precinct house, is a species of early documentary film. 
Contrary to existing idealized expectations of documentary film, the documentary 
genre has never aimed to objectively depict real life.  It has always been a form of 
artistic and politicized expression, representing at least one version of some historic 
event.  This is not to say that documentary film fails to capture some aspect of real 
life, but instead to explain that upon making a film, the event captured on celluloid 
can never be divorced from its filmic aspect.  The film’s images are an embodiment 
of a particular point of view (and not of others) shaped by the essential filmic 
storytelling devices of narrative and montage.  And the film’s images (the fact of 
their existence and their significance) are inevitably influenced by the presence of 
the camera.  Filmmaking in the precinct house is therefore never an objective 
rendering of a custodial interrogation (whatever that could be).  Its product—the 
documentary film—is, and should be, controversial and indefinite in meaning and 
consequence. It must therefore be evaluated and judged in the appropriate context, 
in light of its history (as a film genre and a policing tool), its form (as a constructed 
filmic medium) and its purposes (as evidence and as advocacy). 
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A. EARLY DOCUMENTARY AND THE PLAY OF THE REEL 
The documentary film genre is as old as the film medium.  In fact, the 
documentary genre is said to be one of the first to emerge in the burgeoning art and 
business of film entertainment.167  Tracing the development of several central 
features of the documentary form (and, indeed, of film generally) shows how the 
documentary’s aim was never to expose some truth of history or reality but to 
question whether film could be the basis of knowing or witnessing history or reality 
at all.168 
Cinema is said to have been born in 1895 in France, with the Lumière brothers’ 
actuality films, such as L’Arrivée d’un Train en Gare [The Arrival of a Train in the 
Station].169  The story goes that upon showing this particular film to the first film 
audience at the Grand Café in Paris—it was a film of a train arriving into the 
station, the camera stationed on the platform such that the train grew larger and 
larger on screen as it got closer to the station—the audience screamed and ran from 
the theater, afraid the train would run them down.  Not at all accustomed to the 
illusion of reality in motion that film creates, this 1895 audience feared for their 
lives and never saw the end of the film.170  With this, the film as a collective 
experience began and, with it, the notion that film has a peculiarly “real” feel, 
enabling the audience to publicly bear witness to some historic event projected on 
screen. 
In the beginning, film—or moving pictures, “the movies”—was a marvel 
because of its apparently unique relationship to reality.  Its so-called mythic 
capacity for total world making began with what has become the basic premise of 
film’s unique language:  the ontological bond between the filmic representation and 
the thing or event filmed.  This indexical linkage gave rise to theories suggesting 
that film appears to “bear[] unimpeachable witness to ‘things as they are.’”171 
The actuality films of the Lumière brothers are as close to a representation of 
 
167. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION TO DOCUMENTARY 82-83 (2001) [hereinafter NICHOLS, 
INTRODUCTION].  Bill Nichols is one of the foremost documentary film scholars and his work has 
dominated —if not shaped—the field. 
168. Writing about reflexive documentaries (those that take their filmic status into account in 
authoring a story about the world), Jim Lane says that “[w]hile . . . these documentaries reject[] the 
illusory mimetic flow of the documentary sound and image, reference is not so much eradicated but held 
up to rigorous critique.”  JIM LANE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL DOCUMENTARY IN AMERICA 32 (2002) 
[hereinafter LANE].  The point is that historical events are not denied, but their representation is 
understood and analyzed as just that.  Jennifer Mnookin has written about documentaries and courtroom 
trials in much the same way:  “To succeed, such a documentary must walk a tightrope between 
skepticism and belief, engendering doubt about the evidence presented without also losing its own 
epistemological authority.  The flip side of this irony reveals the structural affinity between documentary 
film and the trial: whatever their ostensible topic, both the trial and the documentary are always in part 
about what it means to know.  Both embody and engender ruminations on the structure of knowledge 
and the processes of its construction, especially the relationship between seeing and knowing and the 
complex connections between narrative and belief.”  Mnookin, supra note 113, at 158. 
169. GERALD MAST & BRUCE  F. KAWIN, THE MOVIES: A SHORT HISTORY 22 (1996). 
170. Id. 
171. ROBERT STAM ET AL., NEW VOCABULARIES IN FILM SEMIOTICS: STRUCTURALISM, POST-
STRUCTURALISM AND BEYOND 185-86 (1992) (discussing the writings of film theorist André Bazin). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892401
SILBEY 3/7/2006  1:03:55 PM 
144 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [29:2 
“things as they are,” or what I have called “evidence verité,” as one might find in 
the history of film.172  Like L’Arrivée d’un Train en Gare, other Lumière films—
La Sortie des Usines Lumières (Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory), Repas de 
Bébé (Feeding the Baby)—are “but a small step from documentary film proper.”173  
As documentary film scholar Bill Nichols has written, these films 
are but a single shot and last but a few minutes, [but] they seem to provide a window 
onto the historical world . . . The departing workers in Workers Leaving the Lumière 
Factory, for example, walk out of the factory and past the camera for us to see as if we 
were there, watching this specific moment from the past take place all over again.174 
One might call this kind of filmmaking “realism,” a fascination with the way the 
camera can capture a truth of historical action in time.  However, as even the 
Lumière brothers understood, a 
sense of photographic realism, of revealing what life has to offer when it is filmed 
simply and truly, is not, in fact a truth but a style.  It is an effect achieved by using 
specific but unassuming, definite but self-effacing means.  It corresponds to . . . three 
important ways in which the term ‘realism’ has significance for documentary film.  
Photographic realism . . . generates a realism of time and place through location 
photography . . . and continuity editing. . . . Psychological realism involves conveying 
the inner states of characters or social actors in plausible and convincing ways. . . . 
Emotional realism concerns the creation of an appropriate emotional state in the 
viewer.175 
And so the “realism” of early documentary film was a constructed reality, one 
intentionally conjured by the film (and filmmaker) to project onto and reproduce in 
its viewing audience a specific rendering of how “reality” might look and feel. 
As such, the perception of film’s capacity to wholly and truthfully reveal the 
world is and was always a myth, “an idealistic phenomenon . . . as if in some 
platonic heaven.”176  Film is not a mechanism for witnessing reality; film is not a 
window onto some fixed historical event.  Indeed, as we know from our own 
experience of film, film no more reveals the world than it reconstructs it.  Film, like 
any representational form, must be interpreted.  Regardless of its particular way of 
making meaning, be it that of “realism,” “avant-garde,” or “expressionist,” 
filmmaking as a representational practice must be accounted for.177  How we 
 
172. I have defined “evidence verité” elsewhere as a kind of film evidence, such as filmed 
interrogations, “that purports to be unmediated and unselfconscious film footage of actual events.”  
Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 507. 
173. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 83. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added). 
176. ANDRÉ BAZIN, WHAT IS CINEMA? 17 (Hugh Gray trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967). 
177. As Louis Menand has written recently about the documentarist Frederick Wiseman, with 
every film, Wiseman urges on his audience questions about film’s form, its particular perspective and its 
way of making meaning. 
 
 Part of the experience of watching his movies . . . is asking yourself:  Why these scenes, where 
nothing much seems to be happening, and not other scenes, where something might actually be 
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account for that meaning through celluloid images depends on our familiarity and 
understanding of film technique and form. 
 
B. NARRATIVE, VOICE AND POINT OF VIEW 
One way that early documentary film developed its message is through 
narrative.  The actuality films of the Lumière brothers did not capture audience’s 
attention for long.  Within a decade, the actuality genre evolved with the 
expectation of narrative.178  Audiences began to anticipate that a film, no matter its 
documentary intent, had a story to tell—a beginning, a conflict and a resolution.179  
Trains were not now only heading toward film audiences, but these trains were 
populated by bank robbers and good citizens getting from here to there.  Edwin 
Porter’s 1903 film The Great Train Robbery is credited as the first pseudo-
documentary.  Its narrative subject was “how to rob a train.”180  With the popularity 
of this film came the fears and hopes, unabated today, that film serves as the most 
effective teaching tool for encouraging both the perpetration of crimes and 
beneficial participation in civic society. 
Nanook of the North, Robert Flaherty’s 1914 film about the Inuit in northern 
Canada, which is renowned among early narrative documentaries, was such a 
worldwide hit that it led to early branding of merchandise. “[I]n Germany, an ice-
 
happening?  And then: What about those other scenes?  Could they open onto a different side of 
the story?  Wiseman’s point, in talking about his movies as fictions, seems to be that these are 
questions that people always should be asking.  There may be a neutral style, but there is no 
neutrality. 
 
Menand, supra note 5, at 94. 
178. In fact, even actuality films were narratives, but narratives that were structured around time 
and space (when to begin and when to end and where to point the camera) and less around editing 
(where and how to cut and paste different beginnings, middles and endings together). 
179. When I invoke the concept of narrative, I recognize that I am invoking something much more 
complex than just a story with a beginning, conflict and resolution.  In literary studies, narrative theory 
is a dense, diverse field of scholarship, the details of which are beyond the scope of this article.  
Generally speaking, however, the study of narrative is the study of life shaped by plot, character and 
genre, organized by time and moral significance.  “Narratives resolve conflict and achieve order.”  
NICHOLS, BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 91.  It is, in short, the study of “the story-like qualities of social 
life.”  PHILIP SMITH, CULTURAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 183 (2001).  See also PAUL RICOEUR, 
TIME AND NARRATIVE I 52 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1984) 
(“[Historical time becomes human time] to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and 
narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.”).  As such, the 
study of narrative, while perhaps originating with the study of literature and the arts, crosses disciplines 
in service toward understanding the fabric of meaning within and connecting each—from anthropology, 
to sociology, to history, to law.  See, e.g., LAW’S STORIES:  NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996) (law); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey,  Subversive Stories 
and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, in 29 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 197-226 (1995) 
(sociology and law); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND 
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987) (history); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES (1973) (anthropology). 
180. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 6, at 42. 
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cream sandwich was named after the protagonist—a Nanuk.”181  According to most 
historians and critics, the film “owed its popularity to Flaherty’s decision to tell the 
story of a family rather than try to document a whole community.  The opening 
scene, in which Nanook’s large family adorably crawls, one by one, out of an 
impossibly tiny kayak, is the perfect audience hook.”182 
With the story of Nanook and his family, Flaherty intended both to teach 
audiences and to please them.  “What I want to show is the former majesty and 
character of these people, while it is still possible—before the white man has 
destroyed not only their character, but the people as well.”183  In order to 
accomplish this, Flaherty resorted to common techniques and process of 
filmmaking and storytelling:  shaping sets, choreographing scenes and editing 
takes.184 
Flaherty arranged . . . to film a walrus hunt in order to show how indigenous people 
once gathered food.  The Inuit had long since stopped walrus-hunting, [however,] and 
they ended up struggling to drag a harpooned walrus out of the Arctic surf and 
begging Flaherty to shoot it with his rifle. . . . Later on, Nanook and his family are 
shown building an igloo out in the wilderness.  It was too dark inside the igloo to film, 
so a special igloo—in other words, a set—was constructed with one wall removed, 
and the family was filmed, in daylight, pretending to go to bed.  When a shot didn’t 
work, Flaherty asked his subjects to repeat what they were doing until he was 
satisfied.185 
While some might feel betrayed by Flaherty’s staging of Nanook’s family 
activities, this is the essential stuff of narrative—emphasizing certain events and 
facts and omitting others—and therefore of early documentary.   
Some contemporary critics discredit instances of reenactment as inauthentic. . . . 
But . . . the use of reenactment and arranged scenes has a long and illustrious history 
in nonfiction film, both in the United States and abroad.  There is even evidence that 
arranging scenes was once considered a central and normative documentary 
technique.  American newsreels, for example, are notorious for their 
reenactments. . . .186   
This is not to say that the documentary genre was a fictionalized one from the 
beginning, but rather that all films, whether based on real events, are the product of 
certain essential choices that determine the shape and focus of the tale. Indeed, the 
 
181. Menand, supra note 5, at 92. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. See CARL PLANTINGA, RHETORIC AND REPRESENTATION IN NONFICTION FILM 35 (1997). 
185. Menand, supra note 5, at 92. 
186. PLANTINGA, supra note 184, at 36.  One scholar comments that “although reenactment and 
staging were thought for years to be prototypical documentary techniques, today many critics and 
filmmakers think of them as improper for the documentary, and reserve staging for the kitchy [sic] ranks 
of ‘reality’ television.”  Id. at 37.  It is interesting that reenactments and staging would be more easily 
accepted (by critics and audiences) under the rubric of “reality” television than motion picture film, 
especially given that television is where many of us receive our news and the movie theater where we go 
for entertainment. 
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inevitability of narrative—inescapable plot and character selections, who to include 
in the story, when and how, when to begin the story, when to refocus it—provides 
Flaherty, as well as other documentarists, with a defense to the accusation of fraud. 
With narrative comes the development of voice, or point of view.  It is 
unavoidable that films have such a voice:  there is always a filmmaker whose 
perspective—and not others—is being captured by the camera.  “The 
documentarist, like any communicator in any medium, makes endless choices.  
He . . . selects topics, people, vistas, angles, lens, juxtapositions, sounds, words.  
Each selection is an expression of his point of view, whether he is aware of it or 
not, whether he acknowledges it or not.”187  For documentary, in particular, the 
stakes in the shape of that voice were particularly high.  A documentary can tell a 
story from the point of view of an omniscient narrator—one that is perceived as 
telling a story from a superior vantage point, one that is without reflection 
understood as unbiased and whole.  A documentary can also present its story from 
the points of view of multiple characters in the film, thereby self-consciously 
fragmenting the story and giving the viewer the experience of seeing the story from 
different perspectives.188 
The development of these different perspectives in documentary film provoked 
significant epistemological uncertainties.  One was to highlight the by-now obvious 
fact that all stories, even true ones, can be truthfully told from different angles, with 
different morals and objectives.  Another was to enable (perhaps even encourage) a 
judgment by the film audience about the authority of the film voice (whether it be 
an implicit or explicit narrator).  Indeed, given the combination of factual assertions 
and epistemological uncertainties that were embedded in the documentary genre 
from the outset, attention to documentary voice—although varied—almost always 
concerns building credibility and authority for the story being told.  On the one 
hand, documentaries “use sound and image as evidence to make an argument about 
the social and historical world.”189 On the other hand, documentary film practice 
questions the very possibility of having faith in the value of what you see.190  In 
this way, the most that can be said with certainty about the authenticity of the 
 
187. See Bruzzi, supra note 86, at 4 (quoting Eric Barnouw). 
188. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 91, 97. 
189. LANE, supra note 168, at 14 
190. Jennifer Mnookin, writing about the affinities of trials and documentaries, notes that 
 
 it is not simply that each is a representation, inevitably partial, inevitably selective (this is true, 
but not surprising).  What is more interesting is the way that both rhetorical forms have 
something deeper in common, the way they hide their constructed nature in plain sight.  They 
each offer performances that are just that: performances—and yet, when they succeed, these 
performances manage to stand in for the actual, they manage to be accepted as both persuasive 
and true. 
 
Mnookin, supra note 113, at 190-91.  I agree with this observation.  I would go further and say that 
while the documentary genre historically aims to persuade, it does not aim to propagate truth.  Instead of 
truth, I would suggest that documentaries aim toward right or righteousness, persuading toward a good 
or just or beneficial view of the world (or one that might enact such a view of the world).  Law and legal 
trials aspire similarly.  
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documentary film’s story is that the event filmed actually occurred, even if it 
“occurred, like most fiction-based acts, solely for the purpose of being filmed.”191 
Bill Nichols has developed a typology of narrative perspectives, or voices, for 
documentary film that roughly follows the development of the documentary film 
form over its 110-year history.  The four types he identifies are expository, 
observational, participatory and reflexive.192  These perspectives are each 
variations on the documentary balance between factual assertions and 
epistemological doubt.  The first two types of documentary film voice attempts to 
build credibility through a sense of objectivity.  Expository film, the earliest of 
documentaries, accomplishes this objective stance with an omniscient narrator, or 
“Voice-of-God” commentary.193  Observational film, which developed much later 
in the 1950s and 1960s (and was also known as direct cinema), did away with overt 
narration and instead established its credibility by appearing to have the filmmaker 
“look in on life as it is lived.”194  Without overt narration, direct cinema seems to 
be the most neutral of all film styles, although its lack of conscious aestheticization 
does not mean it is not framed, interpretable or mutable in meaning.  As with 
expository documentaries, observational films “tend . . . to reveal aspects of 
character and individuality.”195  And, like expository documentaries, direct cinema 
style raises questions of staging and authenticity.  As Nichols asks of observational 
film and its subjects, 
Do people conduct themselves in ways that will color our perception of them, for 
better or worse, in order to satisfy a filmmaker who does not say what it is he wants? 
Does the filmmaker seek out others to represent because they possess qualities that 
may fascinate viewers for the wrong reasons? . . . Has the filmmaker sought the 
informed consent of participants and made it possible for such informed consent to be 
understood and given?  To what extent can a filmmaker explain the possible 
consequences of allowing behavior to be observed and represented to others?196 
The second two styles of documentary—participatory and reflexive—advance 
 
191. Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 589. 
192. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 99-138.  Nichols also includes poetic 
documentary (early films that are fragments and collages) and performative documentary (akin to 
expressive or avant-garde cinema that emphasizes subjectivity over the possibility of objective 
knowledge) in his typology.  I exclude them from discussion here because these kinds of films are 
neither received as nor intended to be objective portrayals of historical events.  Rather they are 
considered responses to the notion that there is such a thing as objective knowledge and coherent 
meaning.  “Performative documentary underscores the complexity of our knowledge of the world by 
emphasizing its subjective and affective dimensions.”  Id. at 131.  “The poetic mode began . . . as a way 
of representing reality in terms of a series of fragments, subjective impressions, incoherent acts, and 
loose associations.”  Id. at 103. 
193. PLANTINGA, supra note 184, at 101.  Examples of expository documentary include Pare 
Lorenz’s The Plow That Broke The Plains (1936), Jon Else’s Yosemite: The Fate of Heaven (1988) 
(narrated by Robert Redford), and television news.  PLANTINGA, supra note 174, at 101. 
194. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 111.  Examples of observational cinema include 
Richard Leacock’s Primary (1960) and Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1934).  NICHOLS, 
BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 111. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
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their credibility not through a put-on sense of impartiality or detachment, but rather 
by revealing all:  the filmmaker, the film form and the process of filmmaking.  
Participatory and reflexive documentaries include the filmmaker more overtly in 
the film, either with interviews (performative) or with making apparent the 
filmmaking process itself (reflexive).197  The intention in doing so is not to 
challenge the integrity of the event or persons represented on film, but, to the 
contrary, to attempt to incorporate the “ethics and politics of encounter” into the 
story being told.198  With reflexive documentaries, “[i]nstead of seeing through 
documentaries to the world beyond them, [they] ask us to see documentary for 
what it is: a construct or representation.”199  The strategy behind these kinds of 
films is to expose the manner in which the film is made and the story is told so that 
the viewer is provided the tools with which to judge for herself the film’s authority 
or credibility.200 
All of these documentary “voices” are choices of presentation, the aim of which 
is to authorize the story, to convince the audience of the integrity of the facts 
revealed.  Each voice contributes differently toward a common effect of film, “the 
viewer’s neglect of his or her actual situation, in front of a movie screen, 
interpreting a film, in favor of imaginary access to the events shown on the screen 
as if it is only these events that require interpretation, not the film.”201 
The development of distinctive voices in documentary film results in competing 
tendencies.  On the one hand, the experimentation with documentary voices and 
their development over time might be an attempt to effect the most authentic and 
true portrayal of lived experience.202  On the other hand, it emphasizes the very fact 
 
197. For a more in depth discussion of reflexive filmmaking and its effect on the authority of the 
message it conveys, see Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 536-39.  Examples of participatory 
documentary include Ross McElwee’s SHERMAN’S MARCH (1985) and SHOAH (1985).  Examples of 
reflexive documentary include Dziga Vertov’s CHELOVEK S KINO-APPARATOM [MAN WITH A MOVIE 
CAMERA] (1929), as well as DAVID HOLZMAN’S DIARY (Jim McBride 1968) and Trinh Minh-ha’s 
REASSEMBLAGE (1982). 
198. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 116. 
199. Id. at 125 (emphasis omitted). 
200. “[T]he experience of film is less about the quality of the information film conveys about the 
thing or event filmed, but about identifying the film’s point of view and, through that identification, 
being able to judge the source and making of the film itself.”  Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 
539. 
201. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 125.  This is true even with the reflexive mode 
of documentary. 
 
 [S]elf-reflexivity in film enables both a critique of film’s fictive nature and the confirmation of 
film as an objective form of knowledge.  Spectators understand that what they are viewing is a 
point of view—a filmic point of view—and, because they are made aware, they feel capable of 
making judgments about what they see as true. 
 
Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 538-39.  
202. As I have said elsewhere, 
 In one sense, the first person narrative helped perpetuate the sense of singularity and wholeness 
in the viewing audience, the sense that they were seeing with their own eyes the events on screen 
as if live before them; in another sense, however, knowing and seeing, from that singular 
perspective, was problematized as based on the trustworthiness of the individual doing the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892401
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of a point of view.  Every story being told—even if taken directly from lived 
experience—is only a part of that experience; it is only one perspective on that 
historical event with varying degrees of obfuscated involvement by the filmmaker 
in shaping the event as it unfolds. 
C. MONTAGE AND FRAMING TECHNIQUES 
Film’s other basic story-telling device, montage, is “the creation of sense or 
meaning not objectively contained in the images themselves but derived 
exclusively from their juxtaposition.”203  The famous “Kuleshov experiments” of 
the Moscow Film School in the 1920s established the principle of montage.  By 
taking the same film of an actor (Mozhukhin’s face), inserting it into three different 
contexts, and showing the sequence to student-audiences, Kuleshov demonstrated 
how the meaning of a single shot could change dramatically depending on the 
images that preceded and followed it. 
Kuleshov cut the shot of Mozhukhin’s face into three pieces.  He juxtaposed one of 
the strips with a shot of a plate of hot soup; he juxtaposed the second with a shot of a 
child (in some accounts, an old woman) in a coffin; he juxtaposed the third with a shot 
of a little girl playing with a toy bear.  When viewers . . . saw the finished sequence, 
they praised Mozhukhin’s acting: his hunger when confronted with a bowl of soup, 
his sorrow for “his dead child” (their interpretation), his joy when watching “his 
daughter” playing.  Mozhukhin’s neutral expression was identical in all three pieces 
of film.  The juxtaposed material . . . evoked the concept or emotion in the audience, 
which then projected it into the actor.  Editing alone had created the scenes, their 
emotional content and meaning, and even a brilliantly understated performance!204 
Montage is not only the juxtaposition of discrete images to evoke specific 
emotions or concepts.  It also entails searching throughout the film footage for 
transitions between scenes—that is, cutting and splicing film sequences to adjoin 
and contrast those filmed.205  Montage attempts to move beyond a cinema of 
attractions (like the early films of actuality) and toward narrative film form, while 
still building upon film’s “capacity to represent the historical world with 
photographic fidelity.”206  Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov were two pioneers of 
montage—and of documentary.  While portraying purportedly truthful stories of 
the Soviet revolution, these documentarists also explicitly served that political 
cause.  Where Eisenstein’s films were about historical revolutionary elements or 
 
storytelling and to whose view the audience is privy. 
 
Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 535. 
203. BAZIN, supra note 176, at 25.  In addition to its claim to fame as the first “faux doc,” The 
Great Train Robbery’s other contribution to film is its relational editing, a narrative form of montage. 
By juxtaposing shots of otherwise discontinuous images and cutting back and forth between different 
scenes, the film creates narrative logic where there was none before. 
204. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 6, at 176. 
205. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 95-96 (“[Montage entails] hunting for montage 
fragments . . . to capture the essential link shots . . . [to] bring[] out the core of the film-object….”). 
206. Id. at 96. 
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moments—the Battleship Potemkin (Potemkin) and the October revolution 
(October)—Vertov’s films, which unfolded like newsreels, were more overtly 
documentary. 
Vertov, like the observational filmmakers of the 1960s, eschewed all forms of 
scripting, staging, acting, or reenacting.  He wanted to catch life raw-handed and then 
to assemble from it a vision of the new society in the process of emergence.  His own 
term for the cinema, kinopravda (film-truth), insisted on a radical break with all forms 
of theatrical, literary structure for film.207 
Both filmmakers mobilized montage techniques—jarring editing, the 
juxtaposition of divergent images to evoke strong emotion or intelligent response—
in order to “serve the revolutionary aspirations of the moment.”208  “[T]he ways in 
which views of the world were recast in shooting and editing . . . demonstrated that 
complex films could be constructed from fragments of the historical world rejoined 
to give expression to a particular viewpoint.”209  Their intention was both to 
document and to foment the revolution through film, recognizing that the public 
meaning of the revolution—that is, how it was understood and appreciated—would 
in significant part take shape through their films. They asked:  “[H]ow could [film] 
represent the ‘new man’ of communist society; how could it construct a distinct 
culture freed from bourgeois tradition?”210  The techniques of montage and the new 
art of cinema “laid the groundwork for the didactic emphasis that [later filmmakers 
in Europe would] g[i]ve to documentary . . . [in] the 1930s.”211 
Another way of making meaning uniquely through film is by carefully 
manipulating the camera, including its perspective (angles) and breadth of view 
(wide shots and focus).212  D.W. Griffith, the initial master of this kind of film 
language, was the original engineer of the close-up, deep focus, the long shot, pan 
shot and traveling shot.213 
Griffith had learned . . . [that] [f]ilms were capable of mirroring not only physical 
activities but mental processes.  Films could recreate the activities of the mind: the 
focusing of attention on one object or another (by means of a close up), the recalling 
of memories or projecting of imaginings (by means of a flashback, flash forward, or 
mind-screen), the division of interest (by means of the cross-cut).  Griffith had come 
to realize . . . the importance of the interplay between events presented on the screen 
and the spectator’s mental synthesis of those events.  Griffith’s “discovery” was far 
more than mere technique . . . it was the way to make film narrative, storytelling with 
 
207. Id. at 143. 
208. Id. at 142. 
209. Id. at 97. 
210. Id. at 142. 
211. Id. at 97. 
212. Carl Plantinga discusses other methods of making meaning in non-fiction film, what he calls 
“nonfiction discourse”—selection, order, emphasis and voice—but, in my view, these categories are not 
unique to film but apply to any work of non-fiction.  I therefore do not discuss them here.  PLANTINGA, 
supra note 184, at 83-100. 
212. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 6, at 57. 
213. Id. at 54. 
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moving images, consistently coherent.214 
These film techniques are now ubiquitous in all film genres, including 
documentaries.  “The beginning and ending of The Times of Harvey Milk, for 
example, use slow motion . . . [t]ogether with the synthesized music, . . . [to] evoke 
a dreamlike quality that suggests the importance we often attribute to assassinated 
leaders. . . . [This] scene clearly preserves the unity of the film’s rhetorical 
emphasis by mythologizing the fight for gay rights in the person of Harvey 
Milk.”215 
Although documentaries may have been one of the first film genres to develop 
due to film’s inherent capacity to photographically represent historic circumstances, 
it shares its formal features—its modes of expression—with those of fiction film. 
[T]hose who adopt the documentary as their vehicle of expression turn our attention to 
the world we already occupy.  They do so with the same resourcefulness and 
inventiveness that fiction filmmakers use to draw our attention to worlds we would 
have otherwise never known.  Documentary film and video, therefore, display the 
same complexity and challenge, the same fascination and excitement as any of the 
genres of fiction film.216 
The effects of montage on the interpretation of filmed confessions will be 
discussed below in Part III. 
D. DOCUMENTARY AS ADVOCACY 
Both montage and narrative, although film elements developed by early 
documentarists to reveal a world to its audience, are also formal features of film 
that self-consciously and intentionally construct a world, as well as expectations 
and relationships in and about that world. 
Narrative not only facilitates the representation of historical time, it also supplies 
techniques by which to introduce the moralizing perspective or social belief of an 
author and a structure of closure whereby initiating disturbances can receive 
satisfactory resolution . . . giv[ing] an imprimatur of conclusiveness to the 
arguments . . . advanced by the film.217 
Nanook of the North, Flaherty’s effort to eulogize the Inuit, is just one example 
of moral narrativizing.  Dziga Vertov’s spliced and edited newsreels is an example 
of the power of montage to “remake the world in the image of a revolutionary new 
society.”218  Even without excessive montage or overt narrativizing, observational 
 
214. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis omitted).  Indeed, it is clear from Griffith’s films, in particular BIRTH 
OF A NATION, that one of the stories he was actively cultivating through the new art of film was of 
American racism and white supremacy.  Id. at 69-70. 
215. PLANTINGA, supra note 184, at 152-53.  THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (Richard Schmiechen 
1984) was directed by Robert Epstein. 
216. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at xiv. 
217. Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 589-91. 
218. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 96. 
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documentary or “direct cinema” can remake or affect a new reality.  Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will is the quintessential example.  It gains its power 
as advocacy—for the glory of Nazi citizenship—by seeming not to narrate its 
tale.219  That much of Triumph of the Will was staged precisely for the camera, 
“including the repeat filming of some speeches at another time and place when the 
original footage proved unusable,”220 does not decrease its effectiveness as 
journalism and political advocacy. 
These three examples highlight documentary film’s perhaps most important and 
overlooked feature:  its activist goals, which, in the beginning, were partnered (if 
informally) with the power of the state.221  “Due to its rhetorical potency as a tool 
for nation building, public education, and advocacy, the documentary form has 
consistently been harnessed to the manufacture of social consent.”222  To be sure, 
there are exceptions to this rule, but at least the heyday of documentary, the 1920s 
and 1930s, saw the “value of [documentary] cinema . . . in its capacity to . . . enact 
the proper or improper terms of individual citizenship and state responsibility.”223  
As Bill Nichols has argued, although the “documentary form was latent in cinema 
from the outset,” the solidification of the documentary as a film genre “takes shape 
at the point when cinema comes into direct service of various, already active efforts 
to build national identity.”224 
Like newspapers and radio before it, cinema contributed a powerful rhetorical voice to 
the needs of the modern state.  The modern state had to find ways to enact popular, 
compelling representations of the state’s policies and programs.  Such enactments 
engage its members in ritual, participatory acts of citizenship.  Documentary film 
practice became one such form of ritual participation.225 
Of course, the state-encouraged documentary was not uniquely an engine of 
communist or fascist societies.  Some of the most famous documentaries were 
made in Britain and the United States on behalf of or in service to democratic 
governments.  The work of John Grierson is the preeminent example.  He is said to 
have coined the word “documentary” and to be the “documentary film movement’s 
greatest champion.”226 His 1929 film Drifters, about the North Sea herring fleet, 
emphasized the economic importance of the fishing industry in Britain.  With this 
film, he persuaded the British government to do with film in 1930 what the Soviet 
 
219. Id. at 113.  Nichols continues, “Triumph of the Will demonstrates the power of the image to 
represent the historical world at the same moment as it participates in the construction of aspects of this 
historical world itself.  Such participation…carries an aura of duplicity. . . .[Y]et the underlying act of 
being present at an event but filming it as if absent, as if the filmmaker were simply a ‘fly on the wall,’ 
invites debate as to how much of what we see would be the same if the camera were not there or how 
much would differ if the filmmaker’s presence were more readily acknowledged.”  Id. at 114-15. 
220. Id. 
221. Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 582. 
222. MICHAEL RENOV, THE SUBJECT OF DOCUMENTARY 130 (2004). 
223. Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 582. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 592. 
226. Id. at 580. 
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government had done since 1918:  make use of an art form to foster a sense of 
national identity and shared community commensurate with its own political 
agenda.227  By establishing a film unit at the Empire Marketing Board from 1930 to 
1933, Grierson gave the documentary film an institutional base and encouraged a 
specific set of audience expectations.228  Grierson’s later films, such as Housing 
Problems, a 1935 film that highlights the social problem of poor housing, 
advocated its solution in the British government’s slum clearance program and the 
rebuilding of new homes with gas appliances.229 
We were instructed, in effect, to use cinema, or alternatively to learn to use it, to bring 
alive the industries, the harvests, the researches, the productions, the forward-looking 
activities of all kinds; in short, to bring the day-to-day activities of the British 
Commonwealth and Empire at work into the common imagination. . . . [I]f you are to 
make citizenship in our vast new world imaginative and, therefore, possible, cinema 
is, on the face of it, a powerful weapon.230 
The United States had its own Grierson in the person of Pare Lorentz, a man 
who worked for the United States government as a filmmaker.  Lorentz directed, 
among other films, The River, which depicted the flooding of the Mississippi and 
touted the achievements of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
When documentary does not serve the state’s interests but instead contests the 
power of the state, the form of the contest is nevertheless a similar “rhetoric of 
social persuasion” based in an ideology of the film as an evidentiary form.231  In 
this vein, recall where we began, with Michael Moore’s Roger and Me and 
Farenheit 9/11 or Errol Morris’s A Thin Blue Line and Fog of War.232  These are 
films very much like the earliest of documentaries—including Vertov’s and 
Grierson’s films—despite being critical of the government. As social and political 
advocacy, these films are simultaneously rooted in “dreams of universal reason, 
 
227. This recalls Lenin’s prediction that “of all the arts, for us the cinema is the most important.”  
JAY LEYDA, KINO: A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN AND SOVIET FILM 161 (1973). 
228. NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 167, at 145. 
229. Grierson was said to have “forged a British documentary film movement.  Recruiting 
talented young men fresh out of Cambridge . . . .  Grierson created a sizable and quite prolific film 
production group enthusiastic in its pursuit of a single mandate: ‘to bring the Empire alive.’” RENOV, 
supra note 222, at 134. 
230. Id. (emphasis added). 
231. Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 582.  Although its roots are in state-sponsored or 
state-encouraged stories of political participation and glory, the evolved documentary form has since 
disengaged from its governmental sponsor and taken on a new partner—what film scholar Bill Nichols 
calls “alternative subjectivities and identities involving issues of sex and gender, ethnicity and race [. . . 
.]”  Id. at 608.  A documentarist’s goal of activism through photographic realism remains.  
“Collaboration between filmmakers and their subjects replaces collaboration between filmmakers and 
government agencies.  With this shift the form and style of documentary representations expand to 
encompass a breadth of perspectives and voices, attitudes and subjectivities, positions and values that 
exceed the universal subject of an idealized nation-state.” Id. 
232. See LANE, supra note 168, at 14 (“Documentarists mobilize sounds and images both to 
establish proof about the world and, through editing, structure, and rhetorical devices, to build an overall 
position toward the evidentiary pieces exhibited in the body of the work.”). 
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[their] predilection for Truth in History,”233 as well as in the power of the public 
aesthetic whose central heuristic contrasts seeing with knowing and facts with 
rhetoric.234 Preoccupations with what it means to see and then to know, with what it 
means to witness and then to judge, with the role of spectatorship in forming a 
political community—these shaped filmmaking and the experience of film from its 
earliest stages.235  As such, film, from its beginning, was a political tool, a species 
of political and social advocacy—as all art can be.236  And documentary film was a 
particularly effective tool because of its impression of authenticity.237 
III.  FILMMAKING IN THE PRECINCT HOUSE 
Keeping in mind this history of film and of documentary, especially as the latter 
developed into a disciplinary device as regards state interests and power, this Part 
III resituates the trend of filming custodial interrogations and confessions as a form 
of advocacy on behalf of the state. 
Filmmaking in the precinct house attempts to address some of the problems that 
constitutional and criminal law have identified regarding confessional evidence.  A 
confession, when believable, is considered the “queen of proofs” due to its “mark 
of authenticity, par excellence the kind of speech in which the individual 
authenticates his inner truth.”238  Exposing a person’s inner truth—whether and 
why they committed the crime at issue—is, of course, one goal of a criminal 
investigation.  But confessions are provided under inherently coercive conditions, 
 
233. RENOV, supra note 222, at 137. 
234. Several recent examples of documentary as legal advocacy are PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD 
MURDERS AT THE ROBIN HOOD HILLS (Home Box Office 1996) and CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS 
(Andrew Jarecki 2002).  On the former, Jennifer Mnookin has written that it is “a call to action, an 
explicit appeal . . . .  While this extralegal form of instrumental advocacy is directed toward the viewing 
public rather than appellate courts, and thus to an audience both broader and less empowered to effect 
direct legal change, the films’ diction of persuasion, fundamentally evidentiary, is not wholly dissimilar 
from the languages of legal appeal.”  Mnookin, supra note 113, at 154. 
235. Like law (and particularly trials), documentaries “both generate and partially satisfy a 
craving for knowledge,” what Bill Nichols calls “epistephilia.”  Id. at 158 (citing BILL NICHOLS, 
REPRESENTING REALITY 31 (1998)).  Both trials and documentaries “create a belief that through 
observing we—we the jurors, we the viewers, we the public—can join the ranks of those who know, but 
simultaneously they risk engendering a fraught anxiety about whether we can know at all.”  Id.  This 
recalls Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous statement that “[a]t the foundation of a well-founded belief lies 
the belief that it is not well-founded.”  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY para. 253 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., Paul D. Anscombe trans., Harper & Row 1972). 
236. The ebb and flow of the popularity of the documentary film genre is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Suffice it to say, however, despite its status as an “in” genre in the early years of film given its 
foundational role in film practice and theory, and its more marginal status during the heyday of, for 
example, the film noir and classical Hollywood periods, the central principles described here underlying 
documentary film practice remained constant throughout the history of filmmaking. 
237. The still photograph preceded film in its role as a state disciplinary tool, reinforcing the status 
quo.  See, e.g., JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION 61-64 (1988) (describing how 
photography contributed to the governmental control, in the 1840s and 1850s, of newly developing 
urban areas). 
238. PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 4 (2000).  See also supra note 105. 
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thus tarnishing their truth claims.239  This is the first problem. 
Another problem, intertwined with the first, is that confessions take place in 
private—as between parishioner and priest, patient and therapist, suspect and 
interrogator.  The privacy of the act at once authenticates the confession (we 
confess to things about which we are ashamed and thus dare not say in public) and 
renders it nearly impossible to judge (as judging requires scrutiny and analysis by 
others).  Yet confessions are routinely judged.  With regard to criminal confessions 
in the precinct house, they are elicited, often after hours of questioning during 
which the “suspect, isolated from all familiar surroundings, ‘[is] deprived of every 
psychological advantage[,]’” written down (most often by police officers) and then 
signed by the confessor-accused.240  “The idea . . . is to get the suspect to confirm 
‘the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe.’  At this point, one 
must ask of the confession made:  whose story is it?”241  Determining whose story 
it is—the truthful revelation by the confessant provided of his own will or the 
coerced story pieced together by police and suspect in order to end the 
interrogation—is made exponentially more difficult by the fact of the “closed 
room.”242  Courts are left to compare a suspect’s statements about coercion and 
deprivation with police testimony about proper procedure and the suspect’s 
“storytelling without fear.”243  These “swearing contests,” as the cases discussed 
above in Part I explain, more often than not result (and perhaps without good 
reason) in a judgment confirming the state’s case:  that the confession is voluntary 
and reliable and the suspect is guilty. 
How does the camera affect the rendering, analysis and judgment of 
confessions?  The legislation and case law urging the filming of custodial 
interrogations explain that the film solves at least some of the above-mentioned 
problems of the stationhouse confession.  First, the camera ostensibly opens up the 
“closed room” to the court and advocates, allowing for direct scrutiny of the 
interrogation procedure without the mediating factor of the suspect’s and officer’s 
testimony.  Second, the camera makes the interrogation less private.  The suspect 
and the police are aware of speaking (and perhaps of performing) not only for each 
other but for all the others who may watch the film.  Less isolated, the suspect feels 
less pressure, less fear that his words will be twisted.  With someone else watching, 
the officers know they have to behave themselves.  All this presumably leads to 
more truthful confessions and more humane police practices. 
In these two important ways, police films of custodial interrogations and 
 
239. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1965).. 
240. BROOKS, supra note 238, at 13 (describing Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Miranda). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. (discussing how Chief Justice Warren, in his Miranda opinion, “uses the secrecy of 
interrogation to create a dramatic story of the closed room, and the dramas of humiliation, deception, 
and coercion played out behind the locked door, convincing us that compulsion is ‘inherent’ in custodial 
interrogation”).  See also Saul Kassin, Op-Ed., Videotape Police Interrogations, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
26, 2004, at A13 (advocating filming custodial interviews to lift the “veil of secrecy” from the 
interrogation room) [hereinafter Kassin, Videotape]. 
243. BROOKS, supra note 238, at 11.  Note that Brooks entitled the first chapter of this book 
“Storytelling without Fear?  The Confession Problem.”  Id. at 8.   
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confessions are also quintessential documentaries:  they intend to show us what 
happened and what was said, to reveal a world or circumstance that desires and 
benefits from exposure.244  They are a powerful kind of documentary in that 
confessions themselves imply “something secret and hidden, something that has 
long resisted [articulation].”245  As spoken and revealed on film, the documentary 
of the stationhouse interrogation—the filmed interrogation that climaxes in 
confession, the intention of which is to prove that the words and circumstances of 
the confession (and therefore the crime) were as the state says they were—is the 
ultimate of solved mysteries. 
Nevertheless, both of these aspects of a camera’s effect on confessions can be 
subverted in light of the documentary tradition.  As described in Part II, 
documentary film is no less a species of artistic expression and persuasive rhetoric 
than it is a sequence of a historic moments. This is not to say that the person or 
event being filmed neither is nor was “real” (whatever that may mean for the legal 
analysis).  It is simply to emphasize that the camera and the process of filmmaking 
is always already “a part of the actual world of the [filmed] . . . subject.”246  Given 
this, the camera is not a window into an otherwise closed room, a peep hole into a 
private scene. It fundamentally changes the room from one into which no one is 
watching to one that is intended to be watched, one that is almost exclusively made 
for watching over and over.247  It turns the interrogation room into a film set, the 
suspect and officers into film stars, performers and directors.248 
Watching the film of the interrogation is not direct scrutiny of the interrogation 
procedure; it is scrutiny of the film of the interrogation procedure.  The scrutiny 
remains of something that is mediated, not by speech and memory but also by 
moving celluloid images.  Indeed, it is entirely likely that a film of an interrogation 
will provide different details of the interview than will sworn testimony.  A film of 
an interrogation provides a unique perspective—in many instances, a singular 
perspective—on the interrogation and resulting confession.  However, as the 
history and study of documentary film explains, a filmed version of a historic event 
 
244. These stationhouse films are also a kind of autobiography of the criminal and of his criminal 
act (a subgenre of documentary inasmuch as autobiography is an attempt at telling one’s story, a 
personal history).  For problems and critiques of autobiographical film, see, e.g., LANE, supra note 168; 
Elizabeth Bruss, Eye for I: Making and Unmaking Autobiography in Film, in AUTOBIOGRAPHY: ESSAYS 
THEORETICAL AND CRITICAL 296-320 (James Olney, ed., 1980).  Re-situating the confession on film as 
a kind of autobiographical film is a much larger project and for another day. 
245. Peter Brooks, The Future of Confession, in 1 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUM. 53, 74 (2005). 
246. LANE, supra note 168, at 18  (“[Documentary film does not] eradicate the real as much as [it] 
complicate[s] referential claims . . . .”).  See also Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 584-85 
(stating that all that direct cinema authenticates is that the event filmed actually occurred, even if solely 
for the purpose of being filmed). 
247. “The ways that the making of a documentary can affect the matters being observed.  That 
observers affect what they watch is practically axiomatic; the very presence of the camera may change 
what is seen.”  Mnookin, supra note 113, at 154-55. 
248. Consider confession expert Saul Kassin’s comment that, even unfilmed, a “confession 
produced by a trained interrogator is like a Hollywood drama: Scripted by his or her theory of the case, 
rehearsed during hours of interrogation, and enacted on camera by the suspect.  Often the result is a 
compelling but false illusion.”  Kassin, Videotape, supra note 242. 
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or a person or a culture is not necessarily the most accurate (or authentic) record of 
what happened, who the person is, or how the culture manifests.  Likewise, the 
camera’s rendition of the custodial interrogation and confession is not necessarily 
the best evidence of what happened in the precinct house as between the defendant 
and his interrogators; it is only one version of what happened.  Of course, this 
status of “best” evidence is precisely the intended goal of the recording statutes and 
case law establishing a presumption that any non-recorded confessions are 
inadmissible.249  Whereas “film makes us impatient for a direct transcription—an 
actual imprint of the person, unmediated and ‘uncreated,’”250—the nature of film 
and of the documentary form precludes that very possibility.251 
As this Part III will do, we must learn to ask at least the following questions to 
temper this impatience:  whose perspective is the camera capturing?  In whose 
service is the film being mobilized?  How, if at all, does the film’s frame and point 
of view aid the endeavor at hand, which is presumably to solve the crime and effect 
justice? 
A. REORIENTING LEGAL ANALYSIS 
1. Montage, Fields of Vision, and Film Frames 
Recall the state’s case against Lataisha Michelle Taylor, convicted of capital 
murder while she was kidnapping the victim’s infant child, and who was 
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.252  
On appeal, Taylor asserted various trial errors, one of which was the failure to 
suppress the film depicting much of her custodial interview and all of her 
confession.  She alleged that her confession was the product of coercion and false 
promises of leniency.  None of the evidence to which she points was caught on 
film, however, because of unexplained, intermittent filming.  Despite condemning 
police coercion and “the practice whereby law enforcement . . . convey to suspects 
the impression . . . that cooperation . . . might be of some benefit,”253 the court 
affirmed the admission of Taylor’s confession.  In other words, despite the 
incomplete film (in the face of the completeness rule) and the concern about pitting 
an officer’s testimony against a defendant’s testimony (a reason for filming 
interrogations in the first instance), this court affirmed Taylor’s guilty conviction 
and life sentence. 
This case is uncomfortable not only from the perspective of traditional Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, but from the perspective of consistently and 
 
249. See infra Appendix (Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oregon and Texas). 
250. Bruss, supra note 244, at 308. 
251. Although a larger discussion, it seems to me that this impatience with the mediated nature of 
film is in fact a reflection of our impatience with the mediated nature (and uncertainty) inherent in law 
and legal processes. 
252. Taylor v. State, 789 So. 2d 787, 789 (Miss. 2001). 
253. Id. at 794. 
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adequately considering this new and powerful species of filmic evidence.  On the 
one hand, the court appears almost entirely to ignore the film of the interrogation 
and confession except when it corroborates the state’s case.  On the other hand, it 
discusses the benefit of filmic evidence in terms of “reliability,” the most reliable 
being a complete film, which this film is not.254  The discomfort arises from these 
seeming contradictions. 
Additionally, this court’s analysis of the film as preferred to other evidence 
(such as testimony) runs counter to the policies underlying recording statutes.  Both 
the rule of completeness and the preference for uninterrupted filmic evidence 
presume that an absence of gaps in a film means it is complete and not misleading 
(a manifestation of the misguided assumptions of film’s transparency and its 
presumed moral objectivity).  The legislation requiring the filming of the entire 
interrogation for any part of it to be admitted (absent exceptional circumstances) 
underscores this point.255  Here, a film is thought to be the whole story of the 
interrogation as long as it begins when the interrogation began and ends when the 
interrogation concluded.  As another court has noted, “[t]o create a detailed and 
complete record, [certain] commentators argue that recording must begin with the 
initial contact.”256  Indeed, the Taylor court devoted an entire section of its opinion 
to the problem of intermittent and incomplete filming, emphasizing its belief that 
filmic evidence is most reliable when “whole.”257 
Saul Kassin, a professor of psychology and of legal studies at Williams College 
and an expert on confessions, has written for years advocating the videotaping of 
custodial interrogations as a way to protect the police and the accused, promote 
accurate decision making at trial and bolster the public’s trust in the criminal justice 
system.258  “The best way to ensure and determine the truth of a confession is to 
record and see the entire picture,” Kassin wrote in 2002, commenting on the 
revelation of the false confessions in the Central Park jogger case.  But what is the 
“entire picture” when it comes to a film with its inevitable film frame?  What does 
it mean for the film of the custodial interrogation to be “whole” or “complete” (and 
hence “reliable”)?  Kassin urges that any filmed interrogation should “cover all 
custodial interviews and interrogations—and with a camera focused on all 
participants.”259 
Kassin would have criticized the Taylor court’s admission of an “incomplete” 
film and its suggestion that the film was nonetheless reliable, despite its gaps in 
time.  How can film be treated as the most reliable kind of evidence for its 
 
254. Id. at 796. 
255. See infra Appendix (Connecticut, New Hampshire and Maryland). 
256. State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 544 (N.J. 2004).   
257. Taylor, 789 So. 2d at 795-96. 
258. See, e.g., Kassin, Videotape, supra note 242; Saul Kassin, Op-Ed., False Confessions and the 
Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A31. 
259. Kassin, Videotape, supra note 242; see also The Innocence Project, False Confessions, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/falseconfessions.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2005) (saying that 
“[t]aping the confession without taking the hours of interrogation preceding it is inadequate.  The video 
may contain or lack certain details that undermine or enhance confidence in the confession.”). 
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comprehensiveness and inclusiveness when it clearly has neither quality?  What 
does it mean in the context of the Taylor case for the film to be reliable but not 
“whole”?  Then again, what is a film of the “whole” interview anyway?  Does it 
depend on the structure of the interrogation or on the film capturing the crucial 
parts of the interview?  What would those be?  Would Kassin be satisfied if the 
entire interrogation was filmed, from beginning to end?  What is the beginning and 
end of an interrogation exactly? Does it begin with the initial arrest?  Does it begin 
after the suspect has been waiting in the police station but before formal 
questioning begins?  Should the camera be turned on for the “pre-interrogation” 
stage to subvert the police technique sometimes called “question-first” or the 
“Miranda two-step”?260  Should any film of a custodial interview include the 
provision of Miranda warnings?261  Does a film of the “entire” interview  require 
multiple cameras or parallel editing back and forth between interviewer and 
interviewee?  If so, who controls the camera movement?  Who makes the choices 
of when to film the interrogator and when to cut to the suspect?  Or, does Kassin 
envision a multi-screen viewing of the different films, each focusing on different 
participants, like a sports event filmed by cameras placed at various vantage points 
around a field?  Would the fact finder then be invited to watch all the screens at 
once in order to make her determination as to voluntariness, competence and 
accuracy?  Or would someone put together a compilation of all these films, and if 
so, how?262 
Despite the intuitive appeal of Kassin’s approach, Kassin hopes for the 
impossible with film.263  There is no such thing as the “entire” picture, “all” of the 
 
260. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding, in plurality, that Miranda warnings 
given mid-interrogation, after defendant gave an unwarned confession, were ineffective, and thus a 
confession repeated after warnings were given was inadmissible at trial).  But see United States v. 
Thomas, 2004 WL 3059794, at *8 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (applying Seibert where pre-interrogation interview 
was not filmed, but post-Miranda statements were, holding that statements were nevertheless admissible 
against defendant). 
261. See, e.g., State v. Ayer, 834 A.2d 277 (N.H. 2003) (recording of Miranda warnings not 
needed).  But see State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d. 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (requiring all custodial 
interrogations, including information about rights, waiver of those rights, and all questioning to be 
electronically recorded); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985) (holding that recording of 
custodial interrogation must “clearly indicate” that it recounts the entire interview). 
262. And who is to say that filming all the participants in the interrogation captures the entire 
interrogation with all the relevant influences?  As with a sports event, there are a limited number of 
cameras and an unlimited number of places to point the camera and perspectives from which to do so.  
The growing ridiculousness of these scenarios demonstrates how the “solution” of filming the “entire” 
interrogation is no solution at all. 
263. What would Kassin do with the state’s case against Danny Cordova in which all of the film 
of his interrogation and confession was admitted, even the deceitful statements of the police that unfairly 
skewed the evidence in the state’s favor?  State v. Cordova, 51 P.3d 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).  Does it 
nonetheless satisfy Kassin despite its obvious problems of prejudice (even acknowledged as such by the 
court) because it is a film without gaps in time?  Even the film of Cordova’s interrogation, which did not 
suffer the alleged mechanical troubles as in Taylor, nevertheless had an arbitrary (or not so arbitrary) 
beginning and end.  Someone made a decision to begin filming at Time A and stop filming at Time B.  
Someone made the decision to point the camera in a certain direction and, presumably, not to move it 
during the interrogation.  Someone focused the camera (presumably) on Cordova and failed to include 
the interrogating officers in the film frame.  These decisions not only implicate montage editing but 
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interview or the “whole” story on film.264  Films are perspective-based.  Each shot 
of the film is from a particular angle with its inherent, built-in framing problems of 
the camera’s lens depth, width and color. All filming requires choices of 
perspective, timing and framing (whether conscious or unintentional), all of which 
affect the interpretation of the event or person filmed. 
The Taylor court failed to consider these elements of film form.  Indeed, it 
suggested they do not matter.  But they must and do.  Gaps in a film are as 
meaningful as shots that are included in a film.  Gaps do not simply indicate an 
absence—a place holder to be filled in by other evidence, such as testimony.  They 
are meaningful in and of themselves.  Perhaps the gaps indicate an intentional 
obfuscation of events?  Perhaps they signal that the unfilmed events are 
unimportant?  Perhaps the gaps are the places in the film most pregnant with 
meaning, most open to interpretation?  In any of these cases, it is impossible to 
interpret the film and to understand its representational effort as if it did not contain 
those gaps. 
These breaks in the film inevitably make a difference in how we understand it.  
When watching a film, we “fill in” scenes not shot with our imaginings of what 
might have happened.  We draw connections between the presented shots, the 
juxtaposition of otherwise disconnected scenes adding significance to the overall 
story.  Indeed, the juxtaposition of otherwise disconnected film frames is precisely 
how meaning is made in film, i.e., through montage editing.265  Here, the court 
glosses over the unshot scenes of Officer Jenkin’s promises of leniency, Captain 
Ezell’s allegedly coercive behavior and the defendant’s response to both.  The court 
wrongly suggests that these “missing” scenes from the film do not affect its 
interpretation of what it sees in the film as a knowing and voluntary confession to 
the murder.  This, despite the defendant’s claim that all the following occurred, but 
was not caught on film: 
Ezell pointed his finger at her, yelled that the officers were tired of her wasting their 
time with her lies, and told her that if she did not tell the truth, she and her boyfriend 
were “going down.”  Taylor also testified that Ezell “cursed twice.”  When asked 
whether Jenkins had offered her any assistance, Taylor testified, “she said that if I 
would tell her the truth, or tell her what happened, that she would help me the best she 
could.  Taylor testified that because she thought Jenkins “was going to help” her, she 
gave a confession . . . . [S]he testified that she thought she was “going home” if she 
made a statement.266 
 
narrative structure, as will be discussed infra. 
264. For that matter, there is no such thing in historical writing as an account of the “entire” event 
either.  All histories require choices of what to depict and what to omit.  See, e.g., HAYDEN WHITE, THE 
CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987).  As it 
would be impossible to recount the entire interrogation in written or spoken language, it is impossible to 
represent the entire interrogation on film.  As Hayden White explains, it is the desire for coherence and 
plenitude of life’s experiences that propels the ideology of singularly truthful or complete histories of 
those experiences.  Id. at 4, 9. 
265. See supra Part II.C (discussing Kuleshov experiments). 
266. Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787, 791 (Miss. 2001). 
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Had these moments been filmed, is it not possible that the court (or jury) would 
have been convinced of the coercive environment in which Taylor confessed?  Are 
the emotions evoked by film images not sufficiently powerful to present that 
possibility?  Is that not precisely why film is as persuasive a tool as it is?  Is it not 
possible that the failure to film these moments suggests that someone is hiding the 
coercion that was exerted on Ms. Taylor just as much as it is possible that the 
failure to film these moments was simply serendipitous? 
In any case, instead of filming these moments crucial to the defense’s case, the 
camera was off.  The court found no meaning in that, or at least nothing that 
changed its view on whether Taylor’s confession was erroneously admitted at trial.  
Importantly, the court did not assume these events did not happen; it merely said 
that had they happened it would not have changed what we understand from the 
filmic evidence to be the right result in the case.  This is akin to saying that had the 
film been shot differently, it would mean the same thing.  Filmmakers, rhetoricians, 
or anyone who carefully chooses words or symbols to craft messages should be 
distressed by this pronouncement. 
How a film is made, what it shows (or does not show) and how its shots are 
strung together are essential to its interpretation.  As applied to the circumstances 
of filmed confessions, consider how specific features of the filmic art can change 
the meaning of the exact same confession if filmed in different ways.  Daniel 
Lassiter, a social psychologist at Ohio University, conducted studies on videotaped 
confessions and the impact of camera point of view on judgments of coercion.267  
Lassiter placed cameras in different parts of the interrogation room and filmed the 
interrogation and the subsequent confession from different camera angles.  Some 
cameras focused solely on the suspect, others equally on the suspect and the 
interrogator, and others solely on the interrogator.  He then asked groups of 
audience-subjects to view one of the three videotapes.  The result was that the 
audience watching the “suspect-focused [film] . . . judged that the confession was 
elicited by means of a small degree of coercion; subjects in the equal-focus 
condition judged that it was elicited by means of a moderate degree of coercion; 
and subjects in the detective-focus condition judged that it was elicited by means of 
a large degree of coercion.”268  In other words, the exact same confession filmed 
from different vantage points, some directly focusing on the defendant, some 
focusing also on the interrogator, were interpreted differently, some as relatively 
voluntary and others as relatively coercive.  Lassiter also explains that “[i]n none of 
our experiments was there even a scintilla of evidence to indicate that participants 
spontaneously, and on their own, became aware that their judgments were being 
affected by the camera angle.”269  In the Taylor case, Lassiter’s studies likely 
 
267. G. Daniel Lassiter & Audrey A. Irvine, Videotaped Confessions: The Impact of Camera 
Point of View on Judgments of Coercion, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 268 (1986) [hereinafter Lassiter & 
Irvine, Impact of Camera Point]; G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilty in the Eye 
of the Camera?, 33 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (2001) [hereinafter Lassiter et al., 
Guilty in the Eye]. 
268. Lassiter & Irvine, Impact of Camera Point, supra note 267. 
269. Lassiter et al., Guilty in the Eye, supra note 267. 
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would not have affected the significance of the gaps in the film, but they might 
have suggested that the film was something other than an objective representation 
of the interrogation room.  In view of Lassiter’s studies, the court should have paid 
more attention to the possibility that Taylor’s confession was perceived to be 
voluntary precisely because the camera focused on her alone (and failed entirely to 
capture the allegedly offending police officer). 
Because of film’s perceived veracity and objectivity, both of which, as I have 
mentioned, are not inevitable results of the film form but part of its ideological 
play, film is a uniquely persuasive criminal justice tool.  This is especially true of a 
filmed confession.  For one, when interrogations are filmed, they are typically 
filmed “with the camera positioned behind the interrogator and focused squarely on 
the suspect.”270  As such, filmed confessions are predisposed to being interpreted as 
voluntary.  For another, confessions are outcome determinative in a majority of 
criminal cases.271  Given this, the practice of filming interrogations and confessions 
does not help defendants (contrary to stated policy intentions), but sinks them, 
whether or not in fact their confession was knowing, voluntary or accurate.272 
Lassiter’s studies show what film studies explain:  that camera angle, framing 
and montage—how film frames are structured and sequenced and how that 
structuring and sequencing makes meaning that is not inherent in the film frame 
itself—can affect the interpretation of the filmed event.  Such is the case with 
Lataisha Taylor or with any other defendant who confesses on film.  Contrary to 
the policy assumptions that film will provide the truth of the confession (is it 
accurate? is it coerced?), film, like any other representational form, must be 
interpreted in light of its specific language and form.  Other than the gaps in the 
film of Taylor’s interrogation and confession, what about the angle from which she 
was shot?  What about the blurriness of the film?  (There was testimony that at one 
point the Chief “attempted to adjust the camera’s focus.”273)  What was happening 
outside the film frame (beyond the shot of Taylor’s torso) but in the interrogation 
room that might have affected Taylor’s state of mind?  These are not questions we 
can answer with certainty—indeed, we do not aim for certainty in law or in life—
but that does not mean we should refrain from asking them.  Indeed, asking them is 
the first step toward understanding the effects of this most “important art” of film 
as used at law.274 
 
270. Id. at 195. 
271. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 101, at 1-2. 
272. This is true even if the filming of confessions keeps police coercion in check and the 
defendant is in fact innocent.  If, for example, the trend in filming interrogations is as Lassiter reports it 
is (presenting the police in the least coercive light), and the understanding of film by courts and 
advocates is as unsophisticated as I contend it is (as an objective and complete portrayal of the 
interrogation), if the defendant is innocent but has nonetheless confessed, the confession will be 
perceived as intelligent, truthful and voluntary. 
273. Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787, 791 (Miss. 2001). 
274. LEYDA, supra note 227. 
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2. Film Narrative 
Far from being transparent or singular in meaning, all films are molded by 
narrative.  The way we understand film is not inherent in the event filmed but 
rather subject to the film’s form.  The courts’ analyses of the filmed confessions of 
both Danny Cordova and Kenneth Gray illustrate how narrative can drive the 
meanings we take from the filmed event. 
According to the appeals court, Danny Cordova was only questioned for an hour 
and a half.275  During that time, however, Cordova alleges that the police “badgered 
him, used extremely leading questions, and placed undue pressure on him.”276  In 
particular, Cordova “cites statements by the interviewing officers’ to the effect that 
one was an expert in detecting deception, that the officers knew what had happened 
and that they knew Cordova was lying.”277  These statements were not true.  But 
the court held that despite the officer’s lies, the atmosphere was not sufficiently 
coercive to be in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Nevertheless, 
according to the court, these statements, as seen on film and in conjunction with 
Cordova’s confession, would have misled the jury.278  As such, it was error to have 
played the entire film for the jury.279  In other words, the court believed that, 
although the officer’s lies did not amount to coercion for the defendant, they would 
have amounted to confusion for a jury seeking to understand his confession. 
The appellate court directed that the trial court should have redacted the film of 
Cordova’s confession.  Despite film’s purported ability to show the whole 
picture—one of its touted virtues as a legal tool, this court considered that the 
whole picture could not be trusted in the hands of the jury.  “Those comments [that 
the officer was an expert in deception detection] could have been easily redacted 
without harming the context of Cordova’s later admissions.”280  But why encourage 
redaction when a film (at least this film) is believed to depict what, in fact, 
happened in the detention room?  If film is as transparent and objective and as 
much of a moral observer as the case law and legislation intimate, why are 
redactions necessary at all?  Do they not corrupt the otherwise transparent and 
objective story being told?  Indeed, do redactions not corrupt the untainted reality 
transmitted through the film medium? 
By taking on the role of film editor, the court is wrestling with questions of 
narrative, with decisions about which details to include and which to exclude from 
the story being told, in order to achieve the story’s ostensible goal.  (A fair trial?  
An affirmance?)  In debating whether certain of the officer’s statements should be 
played for the jury, the court is also acknowledging that the story being told is 
susceptible to different interpretations based on the inclusion or omission of the 
 
275. State v. Cordova, 51 P.3d 449, 451 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
276. Id. at 452. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 454. 
279. Id. at 456. 
280. Id. at 455.  Other comments—those made by the officers indicating that they believed 
Cordova was lying—were deemed admissible as part of the film properly shown to the jury. 
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details discussed.281  This is a far cry from the assumption about film that underlies 
the policies instituting recording requirements:  that film is a valuable tool because 
of its ability to capture the whole truth. 
Insofar as the function of narrative in documentary film is also to affect the 
film’s credibility and its moral tone,282 it is particularly ironic that here the court 
disputes the inclusion in the film of its subject’s own meditations on credibility.  
Whereas an officer may lie to a suspect about his expertise in deception detection 
and all the while maintain a constitutionally acceptable custodial atmosphere 
(calling into question the officer’s trustworthiness while he judges the suspect’s), 
these same lies are perceived to poison the jury’s perception of the truthfulness of 
the confession.  In other words, seeing the “whole story” on film enables the court 
to determine whether the confession was in fact involuntary although it also renders 
the jury’s verdict suspect.  In this way, the court’s narrative choices—what aspects 
of a story make it more or less believable and what should or should not be 
included in the jury version of the film—are perceived as necessary to affect due 
process. 
According to this court, the film has at least two implicit narrative impulses:283  
one that is dominated by the interrogating officer who directs the jury’s 
interpretation of the film and of the suspect’s inculpatory statements,284 the other 
that results when the court excises the officer’s lies from the film.  In other words, 
the film of Cordova’s confession embodies a conflict between the officers’ 
statements and Cordova’s.  That conflict is implicitly narrated by the officer’s 
authoritative position:  it is because of the credibility inherent in the officer’s law 
enforcement role that the court worries about the jury’s perception of his deceptive 
statements.  The conflict is then narrated again by the film itself, its framing and its 
perspective, and once again by the court’s interpretation of the film through its 
redaction for the jury.  No doubt, Cordova could tell yet another story about his 
interrogation using the same basic facts as mobilized by the state and the court but 
that reaches a different conclusion.  Each of these different versions is a function of 
narrative choice and of voice.285  And the fact of these different versions 
 
281. Otherwise put, if the details didn’t effect the story’s reception, there would be no discussion 
at all. 
282. “Narrative not only facilitates the representation of historical time, it also supplies techniques 
by which to introduce the moralizing perspective or social belief of an author and a structure of closure 
whereby initiating disturbances can receive satisfactory resolution . . . giv[ing] an imprimatur of 
conclusiveness to the arguments . . . advanced by the film.”  Nichols, Avant-Garde, supra note 13, at 
589-91. 
283. “This hierarchy of voices reveals a dynamic in which views of the world are [at least] doubly 
constructed.  A scene presents historical events [the interrogation and confession] in which voices [the 
police officers’ and the suspect’s] . . . may compete and [also] presents the narrator’s retroactive 
perspective on the historical events.”  LANE, supra note 168, at 24-25.  Lane is discussing narrative in 
autobiographical documentary, of which I believe confessions are a subgenre. 
284. See Kassin, Videotape, supra note 242 (“A confession produced by a trained interrogator is 
like a Hollywood drama:  Scripted by his or her theory of the case, rehearsed during hours of 
interrogation, and enacted on the camera by the suspect.  Often the result is a compelling but false 
illusion.”) 
285. See, e.g., Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, 7 CRITICAL 
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demonstrates that filmic evidence—even purportedly unscripted films like evidence 
verité—is subject to multiple, compelling (and sometimes conflicting) 
interpretations based on the narrator’s perspective on or bias toward the event 
narrated. 
The case of State v. Gray illustrates a different aspect of narrative film:  its 
cohering and totalizing function.  Recall that Kenneth Gray was a juvenile accused 
of home invasion and murder.  The confession he eventually gave to the police was 
filmed, but the lengthy interrogation that led up to the confession was not.286  Gray 
contested the admission of the film of his confession at trial on the basis that he 
was incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily confess due to youth and mental 
illness.287  The appellate court rejected the appeal, despite significant 
inconsistencies in the documentary evidence that supported Gray, because the film 
of Gray’s confession was perceived by the court to be direct and persuasive 
evidence of Gray’s competence and maturity. 
Like many courts that are presented with a film of an interrogation or confession 
on the one hand, and scientific (or other documentary) evidence suggesting 
involuntariness or incompetence on the other, this court considers the film the most 
reliable depiction of the subject it purports to represent.  The film makes the court 
feel present at the interrogation—in the same way that the audience of the Lumière 
brothers’ first public showing of L’Arrivée d’un Train en Gare felt present at the 
arrival of the train in the station.  The court feels so comfortable after seeing the 
film that it vouches for the fact of Gray’s competence despite all else that is not 
visible on film or that went on before, after and around the film and that was 
supported by credible evidence.  Film’s ideological and illusory reproduction of 
reality grabs this court and convinces it. 
Given the film’s power of persuasion, what do we think of the details of the 
defendant’s personal circumstances not caught on film that the court nevertheless 
rehearses and with which it later dispenses?288  Why does the court paint such a 
vivid picture of defendant’s interrogation (the details of which were not on film) 
only to conclude that “the videotape alone is persuasive evidence that Defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile Miranda rights”?289  I have 
suggested that the court describes the interrogation with such particularity in order 
to lend credibility to its sentiment that the film of Kenneth Gray’s confession 
exposes Gray’s true character—his criminal culpability and his mature demeanor.  
The details serve another purpose, however:  to lend credibility to the film as the 
most coherent account of Gray’s state of mind and of the crime under investigation.  
Not only is the film believed to be a transparent rendering of Gray’s person, but it 
 
INQUIRY 213-236 (1980). 
286. State v. Gray, 100 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
287. Id. at 886. 
288. The court describes, among other things, Gray’s juvenile record, id. at 887, his mental 
illnesses, id. at 888, and his halting responses to interrogator’s questions, id. at 887, all of which 
arguably undermine the court’s conclusion that Gray voluntarily and knowingly confessed to the 
murder. 
289. Id. at 891. 
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is the most coherent rendering of the story of the crime and Gray’s involvement in 
it.  The film—its beginning, middle and end (and because of that which was left 
out)—is a neat package with few, if any, loose ends.  The court repeats the details 
of the interrogation not caught on film to explain how messy that other story would 
be—ostensibly to explain how convoluted the story becomes when forced to make 
the tangible and testimonial evidence consistent with the court’s interpretation of 
the film—as compared to the supposedly lucid and consistent presentation of 
Gray’s person and confession on film. 
The court advises that the film is the most cogent rendering of the confession, 
confessant and crime.  Yet in a world that has embraced (at least to a significant 
extent) a post-structuralist critique of singular, unified truths (qua stories or 
histories or historical accounts), any story captured on film that claims to be the 
whole truth because it is the most coherent is epistemologically suspect.  Indeed, 
narrative theory teaches us as much.290  “For any particular narrative, there is no 
single basically basic story subsisting beneath it but, rather, an unlimited number of 
other narratives that can be constructed in response to it or perceived as related to 
it.”291  This is true for film, just as it is for any storytelling medium.292 
And so, the excess in film, just like the excess in law—such as the tangible and 
testimonial evidence cited by the Gray court—“is the random and inexplicable, that 
which remains ungovernable within a textual regime [be it film, literature or law] 
presided over by narrative.”293  Narrative binds the telling, renders it authoritative 
and significant.  “Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be 
considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem 
of how to translate knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human 
 
290. “The new [film] subject is never totalizing and unified.  According to this logic, if any 
autobiographical documentary constructs the subject in a totalizing position, in the mold of ‘classical’ 
autobiography, the documentary is epistemologically suspect.”  LANE, supra note 168, at 26. 
291. Herrnstein Smith, supra note 285, at 221.  Herrnstein Smith goes on to say: 
 
 2.  Among the narratives that can be constructed in response to a given narrative are not only 
those that we commonly refer to as “versions” of it (for example, translations, adaptations, 
abridgements, and paraphrases) but also those retellings that we call “plot summaries,” 
“interpretations,” and, sometimes, “basic stories.” None of these retellings, however, is more 
absolutely basic than any of the others. . . . 
 
 4. The form and features of any “version” of a narrative will be a function of, among other 
things, the particular motives that elicited it and the particular interests and functions it was 
designed to serve. 
 
Id. at 225. 
292. See, e.g., TOM GUNNING, D.W. GRIFFITH AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NARRATIVE FILM 
17 (1991) (“The primary task of the filmic narrator must be to overcome the initial resistance of the 
photographic material to telling by creating a hierarchy of narratively important elements within a mass 
of contingent details.  Through filmic discourse, these images of the world become addressed to the 
spectator, moving from natural phenomena to cultural products, meanings arranged for a spectator.  The 
filmic narrator shapes and defines visual meanings.”) (emphasis added). 
293. NICHOLS, BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 141 (1991). 
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experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning. . . .”294  This is no less 
true of law and the evidentiary and constitutional questions presented in State v. 
Gray than it is of film. “Real-life stories cohere only incompletely. . . . [P]ersuasion 
[of guilt or innocence] requires a story, but a compelling story requires both less 
and more than the evidence itself.  It requires us to ignore what doesn’t fit, and 
simultaneously to invent or imagine the missing pieces.”295  The Gray court’s 
reliance on the film as the most persuasive evidence of defendant’s competence and 
guilt because of its coherent character (and its exclusion of the “excess” facts about 
Gray’s mental illness or medication, for example) is really a comment on the film’s 
narrative force rather than its epistemological value or legal relevance. 
As it is with so many filmed confessions (or filmic representations generally), 
Kenneth Gray’s filmed confession becomes his destiny.  Yet that need not be the 
case.  The value of narrativity, so to speak,296 is not only its cohering effect (and 
thus its inherent logic) but its inevitable multiplicity.  There is always already more 
than one story to be told297—that is, by its nature, the reason for a trial.  Finding the 
alternative stories that the film tells or could have told will go a long way toward 
demystifying the effect of filmic evidence and truly furthering law’s promise of due 
process.298 
B. RESITUATING POLICY 
Film scholar Bill Nichols writes: 
Every film is a documentary.  Even the most whimsical of fictions give evidence of 
the culture that produced it and reproduces the likenesses of the people who perform 
within it.  In fact, we could say that there are two kinds of film:  (1) documentaries of 
wish-fulfillment and (2) documentaries of social representation.299 
Are filmed custodial interrogations the former or the latter?  Likely, they are 
both.  How are filmed interrogations documentaries of wish fulfillment?  We wish 
that they help preserve constitutional rights and enable the incarceration of only 
 
294. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 5, 5 (1980) (emphasis omitted). 
295. Mnookin, supra note 113, at 170-71. 
296. This is the title of Hayden White’s famous essay.  See supra note 294. 
297. See Herrnstein Smith, supra note 285, at 213. 
298. One can access those alternative stories by asking at least the following questions:  How does 
it matter to the meaning garnered by the film that it begins and ends where it did?  Would there have 
been a different climax?  A briefer or more drawn out sense of time?  Whose voice or point of view is 
dominant in the film?  Whose voice or point of view is subordinate?  What other points of view are 
omitted from the film?  Do the various voices embody a conflict?  Would that conflict resolve 
differently if the film ended at an alternative point?  How would the film have looked different and 
therefore how would it have told a different story if it had been shot from a different perspective? How 
would the film have been differently understood had the camera’s focus been better?  Worse?  How 
would the film have been differently interpreted had the lighting for the camera been brighter?  Darker?  
Are there voices or activities going on outside the film frame that are evident but not seen?  How would 
the film have been differently understood had the camera filmed that activity instead of what was 
filmed? 
299. NICHOLS, BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 1. 
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those guilty of the crime for which they have been accused.  How are they 
documentaries of social representation?  They preserve a slice in time of a social 
interaction between suspect and police officer, a drama birthed from legal culture, 
no doubt influenced and shaped by the very act of the filmmaking itself. 
As either wish-fulfillment or social representation, all documentary has its 
origins in the state-sponsored political art of the 1920s and 1930s.  Are 
contemporary films of custodial interrogations and confessions just like those early 
films (by Vertov, Flaherty and Grierson, for example), aiming to convince general 
audiences of the political and social value of their subject matter?  How might it 
make sense, in light of the film history and theory discussed above, to rethink the 
filming of custodial interrogations as a film project aimed to rehabilitate the 
reputation of the criminal justice system?  Is not the social and political value of 
these state-sponsored film projects (be they judicially or legislatively mandated) 
that they convince audiences (be they jurors, judges or a more general civic 
audience) that the detectives eliciting confessions are serving the public good, that 
most people who confess do so voluntarily, that when they do so they are in fact 
guilty and that, as such, a trial is a waste of limited time and resources?  To be sure, 
there is a defendant-friendly impulse behind the filming of interrogations:  
deterring and exposing police abuse.  Ironically, however, these suspect-focused 
police films use the hegemonic effect of filmic representation to render the 
defendant’s guilt the dominant thrust of their narrative. Thus, this ostensibly 
defendant-friendly legal tool in most cases forecloses the possibility of a not-guilty 
verdict.300  Is it not true that the films discussed in State v. Gray, State v. Cordova 
and State v. Taylor precisely accomplish the state’s goals of rehabilitation and 
conviction?  In each of these cases, the film was interpreted to corroborate the 
officer’s account of the custodial detention as noncoercive and voluntary.  In each 
of these cases (despite other possible outcomes and in the face of compelling 
evidence), the film was described as exposing the interrogation room to public 
scrutiny and affirming the work of police officers and detectives in their fight 
against crime.  In each of these cases, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed. 
Thinking about the filming of confessions as state-sponsored documentary—as a 
form of advocacy on behalf of the state—does not reduce the film’s value as a legal 
tool. To the contrary, it reminds audiences that even though film consists of images 
of lived experience, it is also a species of advocacy, one version of the event.  It is 
molded by the camera’s technology and the filmmaker’s influence.  Thinking about 
filmed confessions as advocacy encourages analysis and attention to the film’s 
perspective, its argument.  This is how lawyers and judges deal with all sorts of 
other evidence, whether compelling or not.  Doing so with film should therefore 
become second nature.301  Importantly, thinking about filmed confessions as a 
 
300. This, of course, presumes a filmed confession or at least a filmed interrogation containing 
inculpatory statements. 
301. The by-now classic example of attorney argument about film—persuasively interpreting it 
contrary to its “obvious” meaning—occurred in the first Rodney King trial.  There, the attorneys who 
were defending the police officers (whose brutal beating of Rodney King was caught on videotape by a 
bystander) slowed down the film and interpreted it frame by frame.  By so doing, the defense showed 
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species of documentary film does not repeat the mistake of believing that filmic 
images are objective, transparent or tell the whole truth (whatever that is and 
whether or not we can know it).302  Finally, thinking about the filmmaking in the 
precinct house as a kind of documentary filmmaking resituates the legal process—
of evidence-gathering specifically and of criminal investigation generally—as a 
kind of storytelling, which of course it is.303 
In light of the developing vocabulary of “agit prop” and “mockumentary” 
describing Michael Moore and reality television, why are those same spectators 
who are critical of these mainstream films and television programs not equally 
critical of precinct-house filmmaking?  Why doesn’t the learned skepticism of film 
audiences toward independent filmmakers and cable television translate into a 
skepticism toward police station productions?  Where is the developing critical 
vocabulary contained in popular film reviews as applied to filmed confessions?304  
Surrounded as we are by moving images, we are all film critics of a sort.  The 
resurgence and popularity of overtly political documentary films, those that are not 
state sponsored but are critical of the government, could readily jumpstart a trend 
 
how the film, when closely analyzed, failed to show the police beating a defenseless man but instead 
portrayed the police working to subdue a violent and aggressive detainee. To my mind, this is the 
exception that proves the rule:  advocates can successfully argue about film’s meaning; they just don’t.  
See NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 22-25 (discussing the Rodney King video and its use in the first trial).  See 
also Judges as Film Critics, supra note 14, at 550-552 (drawing on the King trial as an example of what 
to do and what not to do with filmic evidence in a courtroom). 
302. For the proposition that legal trials are not about finding the truth but about some other good, 
see Charles Nesson, The Evidence of the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (purpose of adjudication is to produce “acceptable verdicts”); see also 
Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1230 
(2001) (“[T]he rules governing what happens inside the courtroom can be understood adequately only in 
the context of the state’s central project of regulating behavior outside the courtroom….”); Ronald J. 
Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1500 
(2001) (“Fed. R. Evid. 102 defines the purpose of the rules as ‘that the truth may be ascertained,’ some 
of the rules themselves have non-veritistic dimensions, while others mix veritistic and non-veritistic 
concerns”); What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture, supra note 11, at 156-57 (“Th[e] 
process of social construction [in cultural analysis of law] does not abandon truth; it situates it.  It 
understands that speculation about what the Real and the True might be, divorced from the discourse in 
which we designate each, is impossible.”). 
303. See Mnookin, supra note 113, at 157 (“[U]npacking the specific ways in which the films are 
‘produced’ also sheds refracted light on the trial itself as a production.  That trials, too, are 
‘productions’—elaborate staged dramas whose relation to the real is very far from indexical—also 
almost goes without saying; a naïve realist interpretation of the trial as a cultural form is perhaps even 
less plausible than a naïve realist take on the genre of documentary.”). 
304. It is not a response to say that the police have no intention to sway the audience’s opinion 
(unlike Michael Moore or Errol Morris, who do intend to change minds and alter legal or political 
outcomes).  The legislative agenda promoting filmmaking in the precinct house is indeed aimed at 
changing people’s minds (about law enforcement in particular).  It is also not a response to say that the 
police aim for justice—making sure guilty persons are convicted and innocent people freed—whereas 
Michael Moore aims to entertain and grow his audience base.  Neither is the whole story.  Intentions are 
complicated, multiple and conflicting.  Michael Moore can be a historian as well as an entertainer, a 
political activist as well as a film journalist, just as police officers can be searching for the truth behind 
the crime as well as harnessing (even pushing the limit of) the power of the state in doing so, all in the 
interest of the community generally and crime victims specifically. 
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toward critiquing filmmaking in the precinct house as a form of legal advocacy. 
Indeed, theorizing filmed interrogations as contemporary documentary, as a 
species of political and social advocacy, captures the nature of legal knowledge and 
its effects.  Film, such as evidence verité, no more reveals the truth of lived 
experience than the right answer at law corresponds to a preexisting, singular fact.  
Instead, we know right answers at law to be coherent answers in light of all other 
circumstances and in light of the policies underlying the legal prohibition and its 
exceptions.  For example, we do not ask whether the defendant is simply guilty or 
not, we ask whether he acted in a way the law proscribes (however that is 
interpreted under the statute) and whether he did so for justifiable or excusable 
reasons (however those may be explained).  Stated this way, there will likely be 
multiple, perhaps even mutually inconsistent, right answers to a given legal 
question.305  A film of a confession may appear to the naïve viewer to be the most 
coherent answer to the legal question (“Did he voluntarily and knowingly confess?  
Is the state correct when it accuses this defendant?”).  However, it is the advocate’s 
job, and the role of the adjudicative process generally, to seek out all other possible 
coherent answers and to challenge the most obvious one—the accusation launched 
by the state against the individual.  Resituating filmed confessions as contemporary 
documentary, therefore—as one offspring of the long documentary tradition—
triggers the crucial legal demeanors of skepticism and scrutiny.  And, theorizing 
filmed custodial interrogations in light of contemporary documentary comes with 
the added bonus of an already critical audience, an audience primed to ask 
questions about the social construction of knowledge and history through mass 
media and about the power of the state. 
In this light, the purpose of filming custodial interrogations cannot properly be 
understood as a way to expose the truly guilty and to control coercive police tactics, 
or, by consequence, to free the truly innocent and document police abuse.  Instead, 
the trend toward filmmaking in the precinct house is better explained as a 
continuation of the partnership between the filmmaker (the police or prosecutor) 
and the state, the primary aim of which is to convince the film audiences that 
accused persons who confess are guilty306 and interrogators who elicited the 
confessions have served the public well. 
 
305. For that matter, there are multiple, mutually inconsistent but right answers to scientific 
questions as well.  See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND 
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987) (describing generally the social construction of scientific facts); 
THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (describing scientific inquiry as 
controlled by socially determined disciplinary paradigms that guide and inform fact-gathering). 
306. People confess for all sorts of reasons, not only (or if) they are guilty of the crime for which 
they have been accused, but because they have been accused in the first instance.  As Peter Brooks has 
written, 
 
 How can someone make a false confession?  Precisely because the false referentiality of 
confession may be secondary to the need to confess: a need produced by the coercion of 
interrogation or by the subtler coercion of the need to stage a scene of exposure as the only 
propitiation of accusation, including self-accusation for being in a scene of exposure. 
 
BROOKS, supra note 238, at 21. 
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IV. CONCLUSION:  THE LIMITS OF LOOKING 
The subtitle for this conclusion—“Limits of Looking”—comes from an essay by 
Malcolm Gladwell in which he compares mammography technology to spy plane 
photography.  He writes: 
You can build a high tech camera, capable of taking pictures in the middle of the 
night, . . . but the system works only if the camera is pointed in the right place and 
even then the pictures are not self explanatory.  They need to be interpreted, and the 
human task of interpretation is often a bigger obstacle than the technical test of picture 
taking.307 
Gladwell was commenting that photography and film are only as revealing as 
their interpreter is convincing.  As interpreting mammograms and spy plane film 
can often be a matter of life and death, interpreting filmed evidence can be as well.  
Certainly, it is a matter of liberty.308 
Take, as a recent example, the hundreds of people who were arrested in the 
streets of New York while protesting at the Republican National Convention.309  In 
prosecuting and defending these cases, advocates have been mobilizing filmic 
evidence of the protests and the arrests.  Dennis Kyne was accused of disorderly 
conduct and resisting arrest during the convention.  He allegedly put up such a fight 
that it took four police officers to haul him down the steps of the New York Public 
Library.  The prosecutor dropped the charges a day into the trial after the defense 
produced a videotape (shot by a bystander at the scene) showing Mr. Kyne agitated, 
but plainly walking under his own power down the library steps.310  The N.Y.P.D. 
also arrested Alexander Dunlop.  Against Dunlop, the state marshaled a police 
video showing him resisting arrest.311  However, the defense counsel discovered 
two versions of the same police tape:  one that was to be used as evidence against 
him and one with additional film frames that had been edited out of the police 
version.  What was taken out of the video to be admitted against Mr. Dunlop?  
Images showing him behaving peacefully.  The prosecutor’s only explanation was 
that “a technician had cut the material by mistake.”312 
From these limited incidents, it would seem that both the protesting public and 
the police understand filmic evidence to be incontrovertible.  But by now we 
should understand this to be a mistake—a mistake about film meaning and form 
 
307. Malcolm Gladwell, The Picture Problem: Mammography, Air Power, and the Limits of 
Looking, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 2004, at 74. 
308. The same might be said of fingerprint and DNA evidence as well.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 38-39 (2001) 
(drawing on fingerprinting and DNA evidence as examples and arguing that forms of evidence may 
escape careful scrutiny when they comport with broader understandings of what is plausible). 
309. The New York Times reported over 1,670 criminal cases relating to the arrests at the 
Republic National Convention.  Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest, N.Y. 
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and about legal process and its promise.313  Indeed, reporting further about the 
growing use of videotape by the public and the state (for pleasure and for policing), 
an ABC news journalist recently quoted Miami Police Chief John Timoney, 
speaking about the police riot in Tompkins Square Park in New York City in 1988, 
as saying, 
From that day forward, more and more protesters were armed with these 
camcorders . . . to the point where now, a dozen years later or so, . . . it’s very hard to 
find a protester without a camera.  And the police are very aware of that.  And they 
are ready with camcorders of their own. . . . If protesters were going to get cameras to 
show their side, then the police ought to have cameras to show their side of the 
event.314 
The point of these recent examples of filmic evidence is to show that we are 
simultaneously persuaded by film’s powerful truth-affect and that we understand 
we can spin through film precisely the tale we want to tell.  What is the lesson 
learned?  That film, like any representational form, must be interpreted and its 
specific language, its ways of making meaning, accounted for.  We must judge film 
as a mediated discourse and not as reality lived in front of our eyes. 
Let me be clear about what I am not saying.  In critiquing the legislative and 
judicial treatment of film in the criminal justice context, I am not suggesting that 
film is ineffective or harmful as a legal tool.  Rather, I am hoping that the critical 
eye with which we view documentary film (and its subgenres such as reality 
television) will be cast toward the documentary films made in precinct houses.  In 
the twenty-first century, technology reigns.  We should not give ourselves up to its 
effects without mobilizing the intelligent faculties that created it in the first place. 
I will end with a bit of revisionist history in the spirit of there being many 
versions of a story.  I wrote of the Lumière Brothers and their film L’Arrivée d’un 
Train en Gare—one of the first films to be shown to a public audience.  Louis 
Menand has reported that recent film scholarship argues that the story of the 
audience running from the theater in panic is baseless.  Menand says 
Audiences did not think that the train on the screen was going to run them over.  They 
knew what was happening:  they were watching a movie.  Movies are powerful means 
of expression, but watching one is not the equivalent of being hit over the head with a 
brick.  You can still think.  If you don’t, it’s not the filmmaker’s fault.  You can 
withhold your assent to a lot of what Michael Moore implies about George Bush, and 
still take pleasure in the way he makes [the Bush Administration] look bad.  You can 
 
313. See supra note 11. 
314. Dave Marash, Some Turn to Videotape to Challenge Police, Protesters, Officers Use 
Videotape to Break Case after Protests, ABC NEWS, June 12, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Nightline/Technology/story?id=833389 (story originally reported on Nightline (ABC television 
broadcast June 7, 2005)).  Reminding us that the camera inevitably affects what is being filmed, even in 
the midst of protests and police emergencies, Chief Timoney goes on to say that “video cameras help his 
officers, too, by reminding them that at any moment the whole world could be watching. . . . [T]he 
demonstrators of this generation tend to be much more restrained than demonstrators of their parents’ or 
grandparents’ generation—maybe, in part, because they, too, want to look better on videotape.” 
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even think the reason they look bad is that they are bad.  It’s only a movie.315 
I would only add to this that lawyers and judges can, and should, withhold 
judgment on what a filmed confession appears to imply about the suspect and the 
interrogators, until all other evidence is considered, and until the film is analyzed 
and understood as the peculiar medium it is.  Because so much is at stake, we must 

































315. Menand, supra note 5, at 96.  This highlights one of the greatest differences between film 
and law, which is, of course, that one can’t say “it’s just a criminal trial” with the same levity one can 
muster about a movie.  This difference says nothing, however, about the similarly persuasive effects of 
criminal trials and films on their audiences.  This comparison merely draws attention to the fact that law 
is a manifestation of the legitimate use of force (the justifiable deprivation of property or liberty), 
whereas film and the film industry (at least most films, filmmaking in the precinct house excluded) may 
be equally affective and inciting but lack a state function. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
State cases and statutes mandating recording of custodial interrogations 
 





















X Passed X X X 
AZ X 
H.R. 2614, 47th 
Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2005), 
2005 AS H.B. 
2614 (Westlaw) 
(applies only to 
juveniles) 
Pending X X X 
AR X X X X X X 
CA X 
S.R  171, 2005-06 
Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2005), 










CO X X X X X X 
CT X 
H.R. 771, 2005 
Gen. Assem. Leg., 
January Sess. 
(Conn. 2005), 
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H.R. 1119, 107th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2005), 2005 
FL H.B. 1119 
(Westlaw); H.R. 
1169, 107th Leg., 
Reg. Sess.(Fla. 
2005), 2005 FL 
H.B. 1169 
(Westlaw). 




GA X X X X X X 
HI X X X X X X 
ID X X X X X X 
IL X 












H.R. 1708, 114th 
Gen. Assem. Leg., 
1st Reg,. Sess. 
(Ind. 2005), 2005 
IN H.B. 1708 
(Westlaw).   





but failure to 
record is a 
criminal act** 
IA X X X X X X 
KS X X X X X X 
KY X 
H.R. 242, 2005 
Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Ky. 2005), 
2005 KY H.B. 242 
(Westlaw). 
Pending Not specified Not specified Not specified 
LA X X X X X X 
ME X 
ME. REV. STAT. 
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H.R. 46,  2005 
Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2005), 2005 
MD H.B. 46 
(Westlaw). 





relating to a 
criminal 
investigation 






S.R. 988, 183rd 
Gen. Court, Reg. 
Sess. (Ma. 2005), 
2004 MA S.B. 988 
(Westlaw). 
Pending Not specified Not Specified Not specified 






X Passed Not specified Not specified Not specified 
MS X X X X X X 
MO X 
S.R. 397, 93rd 
Gen. Assem.,  
2005 Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2005), 2005 
















H.R. 1343, 59th 
Leg., 2005 Reg. 
Sess. (Mont. 
2005), 2005 MT 
M.D. 1343 
(Westlaw). 
Pending Not specified All felonies Not specified 
NE X 
H.R. 112, 99th 
Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Neb. 2005), 2005 
NE L.B. 112 
(Westlaw). 
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NV X X X X X X 
NH X 
H.R. 636, 159th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (N.H. 2005), 









S.R. 287, 211th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.J. 2004), 2004 
NJ S.B. 287 
(Westlaw); see 
also N.J. Ct. R. 
3.17 
Pending; 











H.R. 382, 47th 
Leg., 1st Sess. 
(N.M. 2005), 2005 
















H.R. 1864, 2005 
Gen Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2005), 













NC X X X X X X 
ND X X X X X X 
OH X X X X X X 
OK X X X X X X 
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S.R. 2079, 72nd 
Leg., 2003 Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2003), 
2003 OR H.B. 
2079 (Westlaw); 
S.R. 265, 71st 
Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2005), 2005 
OR S.B. 265 
(Westlaw). 
Pending Film and 








PA X X X X X X 
RI X 
H.R. 5349, 2005-
2006 Gen. Assem., 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 




Gen. Assem., Jan. 
Sess. (R.I. 2005), 
2005 RI H.B. 6071 
(Westlaw). 
Pending Film and 
audio Capital cases Not specified 
SC X X X X X X 
SD X X X X X X 
TN X 
H.R. 204, 104th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Tenn. 
2005), 2005 TN 
H.B. 204 (Lexis); 
S.R. 108, 2005 
104th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 
2005), 2005 TN 
S.B. 108 (Lexis). 
Pending Film and 




TX  X 
Tex. Crim. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 38.22 
(Vernon 2005). 
Passed Any electronic 








UT X X X X X X 
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VT X X X X X X 
VA X X X X X X 
WA X X X X X X 
WV X X X X X X 
WI X X X X X X 
WY X X X X X X 
 
* Evidentiary rule; presumption of inadmissibility. 
** Presumption of admissibility accompanied by criminal sanction. 
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